In our work we will study primarily the development of hermeneutic issues that have developed in German and, more broadly, in German-speaking culture during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is based on the genesis and evolution of the views of German thinkers on the essence and objectives of hermeneutics in the system of humanities. We develop an idea of the general nature of philosophical hermeneutics, that its very existence is a natural continuation of the metaphysical questioning of the world. Hermeneutics, understood in this way, is the ideal of philosophical knowledge, suffered throughout the history of Western European metaphysics.

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
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From Hermeticism to Hermeneutic discourse

Development of Modern Hermeneutic Discourse in Germany

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Content

Introduction

Introduction

In our work we will study primarily the development of hermeneutic issues that have developed in German and, more broadly, in German-speaking culture during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is based on the genesis and evolution of the views of German thinkers on the essence and objectives of hermeneutics in the system of humanities.

In our study, we develop an idea of the general nature of philosophical hermeneutics, that its very existence is a natural continuation of the metaphysical questioning of the world. Hermeneutics, understood in this way, is the ideal of philosophical knowledge, suffered throughout the history of Western European metaphysics.

Our work is first of all a collection of segments, scattered fragments of hermeneutic discourse in the German-speaking humanitarian tradition of the last two centuries, because here hermeneutics gradually and irresistibly acquires the character of metaphysical theory, a form of completion of Western European metaphysics or, at least, its significant. However, even in the absence of a system in the history of the formation of hermeneutic semantic space, we sought to give our consideration a systemic character by tracing the fine lines of intersection between different authors and concepts, as they all eventually added components to form a holistic picture.

1. HERMETISM AS A FORM OF TRANSITION TO HERMENEUTIC PHILOSOPHY

1.1. Foundations of Hermeticism in European culture

Hermetic philosophy is built as a philosophy of knowledge - gnosis. This is its fundamental difference from any other religious system based on faith, that is, on certain specific psycho-emotional states of a person. The emphasis on knowledge as a means of obtaining salvation and the requirements for owning this knowledge in a clearly formulated doctrine is a common feature of the hermetic-gnostic doctrine. In this context, the term "knowledge" has obviously a religious or supernatural, mystical meaning, which meant primarily the knowledge of God. Describing the philosophy of hermeticism M. Eliade notes that she attracted him much more than traditional Greek or Christian philosophy and theology, because it contains a search for the oldest universal revelation and spirituality, which not only contain Judaism, Christianity, Plato, and Greek philosophy, manifesting its source mythical, mystical and magical revelations of the East, Egypt and Persia. She examines not only humanism and bold syncretism, incorporating "Egyptian wisdom" and ancient cult traditions, but also a new "exaltation of the human condition," in which human teosis is characterized by the tendency of humanists to increasingly find themselves in parachristian neoplatonism and hermeticism [1, p. 90]. This ancient, but very conformable wisdom of our time, brings us religious universalism and new humanism, which will help to ensure the breakthrough of narrow provincialism, to establish the ratio of macro and microcosm, and also to create harmonious relations in the world.

The concept of "hermeticism" was proposed by the ancient Greeks: the historian Herodot; (5th century BC) told about Egyptian priests who possess secret knowledge and reduce this knowledge to the legendary Hermes Trismegistus, on whose behalf the word was formed. In the same period, the so-called "hermetic sciences" were formed, which studied the phenomena of some levels of being from their manifestation on others according to the principle of

similarity. This principle, which was also called the law of similarity (or analogy), was, according to legend, discovered by Hermes Trismegist himself and had an expression in the well-known esoteric formula: "What is below is similar to what is above."

Hermeticism was understood as a doctrine that recognizes the existence of a hidden, unknowable essence of things, open only to the initiated. The word "esotericism" began to apply to themselves already Christian hierarchs, in particular St. Constantine, in the documents of the Council of Nicaea. He called himself "the lord of the outside" ("exoteric").

It should be noted that a sufficiently logical, harmonious structure of the hermetic philosophy is based on the postulate of the unity of absolute reality, and finds expression in the words: "He is everything and only he is" [2, p.50]

The principle of monism develops in hermetic philosophy in two directions. Firstly, in the diversity and constant development of the Unified reality, and, secondly, what is important enough for us, in the development of self-awareness as a process of self-knowledge and self-improvement.

The sacred book of Thoth, in the opinion of V. Shmakov, is a system of doctrines expressing separate stages of the consistent self-affirmation movement of the Unified Reality, reveals a set of ways, laws and principles by which the creative spirit of a person, creating his own world, restores the unity that was violated and asserts itself in it, as a part that recognizes itself as a whole.

The Book of Thoth, which consists of three parts, identifies three worlds: the world of the Divine Absolute, the world of the Universe, and the world of man. Such a division goes back to the triune task of philosophy, in particular, F. Bacon sounds like this: "God, Nature, Man" [2, p. 51].

In explaining the nature of man, it is necessary to refer to the fragment attributed to Hermes Trismegistus. "Man is made in the image of the world. By the will of the Father rewarded with wisdom more than other earthly beings; thanks to his feelings, he is in communion with the Other God, thanks to his

thought - with the first. In one, it is established as an animal, in the Other - as not an animal, Mind and Goodness. Understand that the world comes from God and exists in Him, man comes from the world and exists in the world" [2, p. 182].

The Emerald Tablet, being one of the most important works of Hermetic philosophy, begins with the words: "True, true, without deception and without doubt true," revealing a method of self-knowledge that consists of three stages. "Right" means receiving information from the senses, where the achievement of authentic sensory perception indicates the physical world. "True without deception" - reveals the selection of the true part of this information as a result of mental activity in the mental plane. "Without a doubt, true" is the ultimate verification of the knowledge gained through recourse to the Absolute in an act of mystical practice. The intuitive sense of the correspondence of the result obtained with the general flow of the movement of the Cosmos speaks of the astral world of phenomena [2, p. 22-34].

In this case, the statement is perceived by analogy with the degrees of knowledge known in our contemporary literature. From living contemplation to abstract thinking, and from it to practice - this is the way of true knowledge. In this context, this is not about practice as a sensory-objective activity, but about another practice: the practice of revelation.

The landmark work of the hermetic cycle is the so-called "Tabula Smaragdina Hermetis" ("The Emerald Tablet of Hermes"), which is quoted in many treatises, representing a relic of Egyptian, Hellenistic literature. This work, a kind of hermetic "symbol of faith", contains extremely brief aphoristic formulations of the main points of hermetic philosophy. Hermetic philosophy opens with a magnificent picture of the creation of the cosmos. At the heart of its cosmogony are three elements. The first is the "archetypal eidos," or beautiful cosmos. The second is the divine will, observing the beautiful cosmos and deciding to reproduce it. The third is the wet substance or darkness, the material from which the cosmos was made. True, a certain similarity of ideas can be traced

in the picture of the creation of the world, represented by Plato in the dialogue "Time". Hermes indicates the infinity of the "beautiful cosmos" and its illumination with the light of the mind. The wet substance, which was the fundamental principle of the four elements (fire, air, water and earth), was divided by the power of the divine word logos and, thus, the second mind demiurge was formed. Together with the Logos, they created nature and the seven rulers of the cosmos (meaning the planets of the solar system), and also gave rise to the movement, so there was space - the "second god". In the "Emerald Tablet of Hermes" it is noted: "And just as all things came from the One (through the One) or through the thinking of the One (ie, the Logos, the World" I "), so all things were born from this one essence. [2, p. 23].

Then came the decisive phase of cosmogenesis: anthropogenesis. We emphasize that in the hermetic tradition there are two variants of anthropogenesis. According to the first version, after the creation of the cosmos, God created pure souls and bestowed power on them in the heavenly (earthly) world. These souls were the performers of the divine will, but, being entities independent and capricious, they did not want to fulfill this will in its pure form. They were haughty and began to compete with the most heavenly gods, leaving the earthly world to its own devices. After this, God decided to create man and place souls in the bodies of people. As a result of the efforts of both the god himself and the heavenly gods, the human race was created and the souls were encased in human bodies, seemingly in prison. According to the second version, God created man, being a double nature. On the one hand, a person has a spiritual component, and on the other - a physical one. In the first part, she inherited from God the logos (ability to think and language) and the mind, and in the second part she received a body that consists of four elements and is subject to disintegration, therefore a person is mortal. The purpose of the creation of man by God is dual as his nature. In the first treatise of the "Hermetic Corps" "Poimander" (according to the basic version of the etymology of this name, the word "Poimander" comes from the

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Coptic pemenetre - "witness" and means the human mind, which is an emanation of the divine mind, accompanies man its action, providing a link between earthly, heavenly and super celestial, in this treatise testifies to cosmo and anthropogenesis) we read: "The first mind, which is life and the world, being bisexual, gave rise to another mind - the demiurge, who second, he made seven rulers out of the fire ... their rule is called fate "and further:" Reason, the Father of everything, being life and light, gave birth to a man similar to himself whom he loved as his own son, because the one who had the face of his father ... "[2, p.34-36].

The important formula, which is also attributed to Hermes, points to "a magical alchemical transformation, and is interpreted in a broader sense as a" great inner act ", as work on oneself, with the aim of obtaining perfection. Important tools in this process were hermetic axioms that call a person to live in a world of light and reason, not to allow himself to fall into turmoil and inaction, to profess the ideals of goodness and vitality.

"To change your mood or state of mind - as noted in the first axiom, change your vibration".

"To disrupt the unwanted speed of mental vibration, activate the principle of polarity and concentrate on the opposite pole to the one you want to suppress. Kill the unwanted by changing its polarity. "

"The soul (as well as metal and elements) can transform from state to state, from level to level, from position to position, from pole to pole, from vibration to vibration."

"Rhythms can be neutralized by applying the art of polarization."

"Nothing can escape the principle of Cause and Effect, but there is a variety of plans for heredity and the laws of higher plans can be used to overcome the laws of lower ones."

"True Mental Transformation is the Art of Mind"

[2, p. 66].

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Hermetic knowledge, the ultimate goal of which is the approach of man to God, was interpreted as the transfer of the soul to the heavenly world or, as sealants said, "to the stars." At the same time, knowledge had an important both moral and theological function: God was the object of the mind, because knowledge as well as god was bodiless, and reason was his instrument. Accordingly, the focus of the mind, as a person whose carrier it is, is directed towards comprehension, the knowledge of God. It follows from this that piety is identical with the knowledge of God, and evil with its ignorance. In hermetic texts, namely in hermetic axioms, it is noted that God himself desires to be known, desires this, this was one of his goals in creating man: "possession of knowledge, if it is not accompanied by manifestation and expression in action, is similar to the accumulation of precious metals - useless and unnecessary thing. Knowledge as well as health, is intended for use. The law of utility is common. And the one who neglects them suffers as a result of his conflict with natural forces"[2, p. 215]. Despite the fact that the hermetic teaching was kept secret, secret, it should not just be kept and hidden, the law of utility applied to him as well. Knowledge without manifestation and benefit is an empty thing, not capable of bringing good to anyone. The esotericism of hermetic texts "is an allegorical expression of great philosophical and mystical truths, a hidden meaning that can only be understood by those who have" risen "to the true mind" [2, p. 131].

As a religious and philosophical doctrine, Hermeticism was closely associated with occult practice, attempts at the practical application of secret knowledge. In it we see the art of influencing environmental objects in order to obtain certain results, including earthly goods, for example, gold and silver as a result of the transmutation of matter. The authorship of the Emerald Table, an excerpt of alchemical content describing the philosopher's stone, is attributed to Hermes Trismegistus. Hermetism, recognizing the living unity and interconnection of all parts of the universe, could not but excuse alchemy, magic

and astrology, and with them the rationale for the special role of man in the world, which he can assimilate and transform.

On the one hand, such knowledge is strictly limited to the experience of revelation, in which the perception of truth replaces rational evidence, and on the other, "knowledge", which is connected with the secret of salvation, is not just information about a particular subject, but also a means of modifying the human condition and accordingly salvage function.

Being a creature immortal and spiritual, man is called upon to contemplate God and the cosmos and to worship them, because without the viewer the scene of cosmogenesis in the eyes of God would lose all meaning. Since man is a mortal being, his function is to control the earthly world, this means that the purpose of man in the world is approximately the same that God applies to everything. This is how the first cycle of cosmo and anthropogenesis looked when both people and their creator were bisexual. In the second round, according to hermeticism, an epoch of separation occurs, when living beings would be divided, and the goal of man would be self-knowledge, which was to be the beginning of the path of the knowledge of God; the laws of the cosmos and its order were also established. Thus, the ultimate goal of man is knowledge, gnosis. The new image of a person is realized and acquires the characteristic features under the sign of Hermes Trismegistus, it is modeled by the outlines clearly recorded in hermetic books "Hermeticism meant, first of all, the elevation of a person. He is called the third god and, in hermetic scriptures, is treated as a creature of universal nature, as an image of God and the ruler of all other beings, and at the same time as a sinful eon-androgyne "[2, p. 11]. It is also advisable to quote the words of Hermes Trismegist himself: There are only three: "God the Father and Good," the cosmos and man. God accommodates the cosmos, the cosmos is of man, the cosmos is the eternal son of God, man is a child of Cosmos "[2, p. 113].

Thus, summarizing the main ideas of cosmogenesis and anthropogenesis, within Hermetic philosophy, it should be noted that:

1. In Hermeticism, the religious understanding of God as the Mind, manifested by his creations, coexists with the idea of the divine One, absolute, transcendent to the existing being;

2. The world created by God is his objectified image and a kind of second god;

3. Third God is called man. Due to the universality of his nature, man has unlimited possibilities, the ability to become anything, but his true goal is to find the way to God and merge with Him through perfect knowledge;

4. Man is the only creature on earth that combines two different entities: he is mortal in body and immortal in relation to what is his substance as a human being. Being immortal and having power over things, he shares the participation of mortals, obeying fate, being elevated above the law of heaven, he becomes a slave to this order.

For a long time, a number of principles called "Kibalion" remained in hermetic occult brotherhoods, which were communicated during the dedication to enable a better understanding of the picture of the hermetic world outlook and understanding of the world:

the principle of mentalism - "Everything is the mind: the spiritual universe";

principle of analogy or conformity - "The right conclusions are built by analogy from the facts of the visible world to the facts of the invisible worlds";

vibration principle - "Nothing is at ease; everything moves "; the principle of polarity - "Everything is double, everything has its opposite";

the principle of rhythm - "Everything obeys the alternations of incarnations in the planes of being";

the principle of causality - "Every cause has its effect"; the principle of duality of active and passive beginnings - "In everything there is an active (masculine) and passive (feminine) principle" [2].

In other occult schools, the aforementioned principles, in modified formulations, are proclaimed a manifestation of the great Uniform Law of the Universe and are listed as follows:

1) order, 2) compensation, 3) causality or Karma, 4) vibration, 5) cyclicity, 6) polarity, 7) equilibrium. It is easy to notice the absolute parallelism in the interpretation by the occultists of the Uniform Law of the Universe and the seven principles of Hermetic philosophy, and accordingly, the unity of their initial principles or methodological basis [2].

Regarding the origin of hermeticism, one should not confuse mythical tales transmitted by ancient manuscripts with what must be recognized on the basis of facts. Hermeticians, in order to present knowledge to a more powerful character, were surrounded by its emergence of myths, among which Hermetic Master, the Great Teacher of Wisdom, who began the spiritual tradition of the West, Hermes Trismegistus (three times greatest), is considered the founder of Hermeticism. If history has retained much information about Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, and other philosophers, there is almost no information about Hermes. Hermes is the Greek name for Thoth, the Egyptian God of wisdom, who later, during the reign of Alexander the Great, received the name of Hermes, which is referred to as three different, but essentially identical personalities, in each of their hypostases they reached the top, becoming great: it is the heavenly visible god, played a large role in space and anthropogenesis; the second is a teacher, a prophet, a seer, an earthly god, engages in dialogue with Tat, Asclepius, Ammon; the third hypostasis is the author of hermetic books, including the aforementioned [2].

Thoth-Hermes became a legendary personality and a multi-dimensional deity at the same time. Connoisseur of Western mysticism S. Klyuchnikov, referring to the study of occult P. Schure in his work The Great Initiates, suggested that Hermes was a "generic name" that plays the same role for Egypt as Manu for India, that is, sage, and caste, and god. According to ancient legends, the Egyptian god Toth was the patron of secret knowledge, the god of wisdom associated with

the planet Mercury, which was the closest to the Sun and was considered the Egyptians mediator between the gods and the bright side of the month. As a synonym for the caste, Toth was the mystical patron of the order of the priests of ancient Egypt. In terms of personality (however, it must be remembered that this is not confirmed by historical science data and therefore an assumption) Hermes Trismegist is interpreted in the esoteric tradition as a specific person who has reached high levels of spiritual initiation and lived in Egypt several thousand years before Christ, "when the Greeks were not yet Hellenes. " The Appeal of the Thrice Greatest was made in relation to Hermes for being recognized as great among philosophers, the majestic of all priests, the greatest of all kings "[79, p.118]. Among the sciences that Hermes discovered people were: medicine, chemistry, astrology, music, rhetoric, magic, philosophy, mathematics, anatomy. Researchers suggest that it was Hermes who was known to the Jews as Enoch, and having entered into mythology later became Mercury among the Romans. Due to the great respect that the ancient alchemists showed Hermes, the alchemical works were called "hermetic", which in ancient times and in modern language means impenetrable packaging. Hermeticism has become the basis of many occult systems and teachings of Europe. The most famous philosophers, including Pythagoras, Plato, Augustine, and Renaissance thinkers were called the spiritual heirs of Hermes Trismegista.

Hermeticism is not only a monument of cultural heritage, it is to a certain extent the methodological basis of the whole subsequent mystic-esoteric philosophy. It opens the desire to comprehend perfect knowledge through revelation, a taste for mythologizing philosophical abstractions, concern for the salvation of the soul and the resulting perception of life and the world. At the same time, in its highest manifestation as a religious and philosophical doctrine, Hermeticism contains a detailed religious practice, ceremonial cleansing and liberation of the soul, designed to provide Epiphanius of the deity. The only sacrament recognized by hermeticism is the mystery of the Word; the very nature

of the presentation of thoughts in hermetic dialogues is reminiscent of the magical procedure for invoking hidden meanings, so that a person comprehends himself and God.

As a system of religious and philosophical views, Hermeticism arises as a holistic phenomenon, although some theses of various time-sealed treatises do not quite correspond, and sometimes contradict each other. Thus, for example, along with the acceptance of the earthly world and bodily life, in Hermetic philosophy there is a spiritualistic denial of everything earthly and sensual. The tendency towards monotheism prevailing in Hermeticism is also obvious, which did not mean a complete rejection of polytheism. Religious understanding of God as the generating Mind, manifested in their creations coexists with the idea of the divine One, absolute, super-existence, unknown, unrevealed in the world of objective being. Hermetic philosophy is characterized by the consistent use of the motifs of ancient Egyptian mythology (for example, the cult of the Sun) and interest in "practical" knowledge (of the occult sciences). To hermetic tradition belong treatises in Greek, Latin, Coptic and Old Armenian languages.

So some researchers refer to the hermetic literature even the "book of the dead" and treatises on alchemy, which concentrated recipes for the transformation of metals, magic formulas, spells and astrological tables. The priests, who were the guardians of wisdom among the ancient Egyptians, recorded knowledge as a great mystery. So probably formed hermetic works. There is an assumption that they were written not by one person, but by a whole corporation of priests for many generations. Since the number of works over the centuries became too large, and individual works did not have the names of the authors, their entire series was attributed to Hermes, that is, divine wisdom. The antiquity of the ideas of Egyptian Hermeticism is beyond doubt, but it is believed that the most ancient written monuments of Hermeticism, among which the most well known are Poimandr, Asclepius, Hermes Conversations with Tat, are a translation of other, more ancient traditions that were transmitted by Egyptian initiates and the greek

mysteries. Hermetic works have a small, strictly regulated number of actors, including the so-called "sacred tetrad" of characters: Hermes himself, his spiritual son Tat, Asclepius (descendant of the god of healing) and King Ammon (supposedly Egyptian pharaoh Ramses II).

Hermetic wisdom as a monument of ancient Egyptian culture is considered the oldest, not only of the works of ancient Greek philosophy, but also of the books of the Old Testament. "Hermetic teaching, first of all, verbal, is passed from teacher to student verbally, if we take into account the general respect for antiquity for logos, words, language, meaning, the emphasized respect for books, conversations and sermons, then the specificity of hermeticism becomes unclear unwritten teachings; another thing is that the meaning of what is written is far from always as obvious as it is obvious to initiates" [3, p. 9].

Attraction to the basics of hermetic knowledge is accompanied by a certain sacralization. A dedication is nothing but a student's conversation with a teacher, the main form of knowledge transfer is dialogue. But unlike Plato's dialogues, in which the teacher asks the right questions, bringing the student closer to knowledge, the student asks in hermetic dialogues, seeking to join the mysteries of truth, the knowledge of which revealed the secrets of spiritual practice that allows one to achieve perfection and gain immortality.

Plutarch himself was a characteristic model of the initiate and thinker of his era. A native Greek (he was from the Boonetian city of Heronei), he had the title of priest of Apollo, educated, literate, who knew the ancient history perfectly and plunged into religious systems, in particular the Egyptian cult of Osiris and Isis. He devoted a treatise on "Isis and Osiris," which can be considered one of the most precious documents on the history of religious thought of the ancient world, to the consideration of this cult and its comparison with other myths. Plutarch reveals the esoteric meaning of the sacraments of Osiris, comparing them with the symbolism of the Hellenic cult of Dionysus, finding out the commonality of their basic thought, as well as the commonality of the cults of the Egyptian Isis and the

Greek Demeter. He argues that for initiates of the secret meaning of these cults, all forms of worship to the Divine and the details of their rites are just different manifestations of a single search for God, which is common to all religions and have an ultimate goal - bringing the human spirit closer to the Single Principle of Divinity ".

Hermetic philosophy is expressed by the word. Although the words are not always clear, more precisely, not any listener, not any reader is able to understand their simple and understandable meaning. It is especially difficult to understand the meanings when translating pressurized texts into other languages. Knowledge is a matter and privilege of a minority. A dedication is not manifested only in words, its path is somewhat wider and also consists in spiritual cleansing, or rather self-purification. The first step of such self-purification is hatred for the body, the second is love for oneself, the third is the acquisition of reason, the fourth is attraction to higher knowledge. Only a person who has passed the harsh self-purification tests is able to correctly understand the words of the teacher.

Initiation is the first secret path to the attainment of knowledge, the other path is revelation. The basis of the revelation is the mystical act of discretion, which is exercised not by the physical eye, not the sensual, but by something else. On the contrary, sight, like all other bodily sensations in the sacrament of revelation, is dulled. A person opens a special organ of the eye of the mind, only to him are the spectacles and vision of God.

A spiritually imperfect person risks losing composure, so in the process of initiation you must achieve complete control over your thoughts and emotions, changing your character. The student must learn to recognize the independence of his own "I" not only from the body, not only from passions and emotions, but also from his own mind, he must experience the true birth of himself in a new spiritual personality, reaching a state of enlightenment, comprehending the connection of all things, their unity with By god. He experiences the enlightenment of the mind and acquires the ability to see connections where he has not seen them before, to

understand what used to be dark, incomprehensible and so that did not make sense, he becomes able to comprehend the truth, feels power and liberation, harmonizing his spiritual I am with the world I. In accordance with the principles of occultism, initiation can be defined as the process of accelerating human evolution, discovering new states of his consciousness, acquiring new abilities, a new physical and spiritual revival.

The fate of hermetic ideas evolved differently in different eras. Many Christian authors perceived Hermes Trismegistus as one of the most ancient theologians, who gave the people intimate divine wisdom. the religious pathos of which did not leave indifferent representatives of Christian patristics generously quoting Thrice Greatest, especially appreciating the teachings close to them in the spirit of man's self-transformation in the process of knowing one's own nature, of man's understanding of himself as a spiritual being in which the divine essence manifests. The possibility of becoming God, in accordance with the ideas of Hermeticism, does not exclude the opposite possibility: to descend into the lowlands of being. This puts a person before an existential choice: to strive for God or to lose oneself, a choice that is becoming even more relevant in our time. A person who owes space responsibility is both an image of hermetic treatises, and an image of our contemporary. The boundary between ancient wisdom and the problems of today dissolves. Some supporters of the occult make the assumption that hermetic world view may become the neutral basis on which reconciliation will take place over time in opposition to the religion of science. Such reconciliation of official science and occultism, faith with knowledge, religion with philosophy and science, Christian mysticism with ancient humanism was the original goal of the medieval Rosicrucian Order, which became the spiritual heir of ancient Hermetic Eastern wisdom, on the one hand, and the Gnostic, first-century John Christianity, other.

American researcher of esoteric knowledge Manly P. Hall noted: "The so-called new discoveries of modern science often act as a rediscovery of what has

already been done and has long been known to priests and philosophers of the ancient pagan world. The inhuman attitude of people towards each other was the result of the loss of knowledge and formulas that, if saved, would contribute to solving dozens of problems of our civilization" [4, p. 453].

Hermeticism retained the status of a legitimate doctrine and respectable term up to the Great Schism of 1054, when the Pope (Leo IX) and the Constantinople Patriarch (Michael Kirulari) cursed each other in absentia. This meant the formulation of dogma as such in Eastern and Western Christianity. Up to this point, knowledge of the fundamentals of hermeticism was considered a sign of education. Now this knowledge has become considered vicious, pagan "bad" ("pagan" from the Latin. Pagans). The right to communicate with the world of the invisible was monopolized by the church, all other seekers of sacred truth turned into competitors.

Hermeticism with all the ancient heritage was proclaimed fishing

Satan, who had to be forgotten. Hermeticism was revived after several centuries, but under a different name: "occultism" (from the Latin. Occultus - "hidden"). It consisted of teachings about the existence of a hidden relationship between events and phenomena of a qualitatively different order, he comprehended the essence of phenomena that could not be explained either from the point of view of canonical theology, or from the point of view of rational science [5, p. 6-7].

According to some scholars, Hermeticism is the primary source from which we Europeans, through the medium of Hellenistic thought, acquired our most valuable religious and philosophical ideas. There is an undeniable connection between Hermeticism and Gnosticism. Gnosticism, which arose in the first century of the Christian era, interpreted Christianity in terms of Persian, Egyptian and Greek metaphysics. Being formed in the same cultural and historical conditions in which the formation of Christian theology and philosophy of Neo-Platonism (the teachings of Plotinus, Porfiry, Iamblichus) and Gnosticism,

(Jewish Gnosis, Christian Gnosis), hermetism contained a certain similarity with them. Gnosticism was based on the religious and mythological ideas of the ancient East, whose mystical orientation was based on ecstatic unity with God and other supernatural forces and phenomena. "When the Greeks conquered Egypt, Egyptian magic could not remain hidden from them. Alexandrian philosophers were primarily concerned with the problems of being, questions about the nature and relationship of the deity to the world, especially to people. Therefore, they also had to deal with the problem of Egyptian theurgy: can a person, using certain means, influence the gods so that they fulfill certain of her desires "[65, p. 108]. Iamblich, the founder of the Syrian neo-Platonic school, author of the treatise On Egyptian Mysteries, disagreeing with other Neo-Platonists, referring to ancient Egyptian mysticism, in particular Hermeticism, created a rather original theory in which he argued that theurgy was the only way of true and proper worship. It is not only a magical way, but also the only way a person can ascend to a deity. Thus, "the influence of man on the gods" was only to make the human soul a communion of a higher nature, and at the same time to the power of the gods. The religious and philosophical syncretism of Gnosticism makes it possible to interpret hermeticism as the basis of Gnosticism. D. Strandin proposed to consider Hermeticism as an esoteric, Gnostic Christianity, and the mystical meaning of the search for the "philosopher's stone" as the awakening of the divine Christ in man. Any mystical teaching has a soul transformation in its essence. Hermeticism, according to D. Strandin, is a peculiar Christian-Gnostic esoteric alchemy, the use of which allows its adherents to better understand the laws of the perfection of the soul and the depth of human nature [6, p. 9].

Under these conditions, there are calls for the irrationalization of the cognitive process, "about the scientific nature of mysticism" and "the mysticization of science."

According to the American postpositivist, the author of the idea of "epistemological anarchism" P. Feyerabend, the diversity, incompatibility and

alternativeness of theories allows science to avoid dogmatism, contributes to various interpretations of the same facts, is a methodological necessity for modern science and philosophy, therefore modern epistemology should depart from clear requirements of classic rationalism. According to Manly P. Hall, "traditionalism is the curse of modern philosophy, its European schools" [4, p.11]. In this intellectual context, the interest in the knowledge of occult, mystic esoteric knowledge, which is outside of science and is not subordinate to a clear organization, but remains a special type of cognitive, moreover - the spiritual attitude of man to the world, is fully justified.

As P. Gaidenko notes, thanks to the influence of J. Bruno and German mysticism, the doctrine of the coincidence of opposites becomes the methodological principle of Schelling and Hegel. In the dialogue "Bruno, or the divine and natural beginning of things" (1802), Schelling, giving arguments to Bruno, tries to prove that true thinking must proceed from the law of coincidence of opposites. "Only that which is absolutely and infinitely opposite to each other can be infinitely combined" [6, p. 141-142].

The ancient formulas are known: "Macrocosm - in microcosm", "Know yourself and you know the world", "Everything is in one and One is in everything" come back to us with new terms: structural, systematic, consistency, hierarchy, integrity, etc. in which it is possible to discern the principles of Hermetic philosophy, those conceptual schemes of judgments, which the tradition will associate further with the dialectical mode of thinking. Thus, the question of the historical origin of philosophy receives a different chronological framework. Therefore, it is completely legitimate, a historical return to mystical experience as a form of knowledge. Thus, at the III International Metaphysical Congress in Rome, Professor T. Katz (Boston) tried from a gnoseological position to substantiate mystical experience, thanks to its conceptual interpretation. A number of reports were devoted to the mystical experience of physicists and mathematicians. So, R. Penrose made a statement that all outstanding

mathematical discoveries are self-discoveries, not constructions. There is a discovery of the same type as the discovery of islands in the ocean that existed even before they were discovered [6, p. 136-138].

At the congress, they analyzed from the point of view of mystical experience, and Einstein's theory, and quantum mechanics, and in one of the reports it was stated that the reduction of the psi function is an indicator of its objectivity. Thus, Professor D. Murray (Rome) noted that mystical theology studies the transformation of man through his involvement in the divine. But for this we need a new speech, which combined the mystical and rational. Hermetic philosophy has always had an ambiguous attitude.

At one time, E. Blavatsky noted that the clergymen looked at hermetic philosophy as sinful and satanic, and the scientists categorically denied it. The reason for this was the closeness, the mystery of hermetic knowledge, their belonging to esoteric wisdom, the specificity of spiritual practice. History knows the Sino-Taoist, Tibetan-Buddhist, Arabic-Sufi, Christian-Gnostic forms of spiritual practice. All occult knowledge is conventionally divided into two branches — the eastern, associated with the Indo-Arian spiritual tradition, and the western, which was formed in the context of the culture of Chaldeans, Assyria, Babylon, Egypt. The western esoteric component of occultism is represented including Hermeticism.

In turn, hermetic philosophy is divided into two periods of its existence: early - purely Egyptian spiritual science, associated with the name of Hermes Trismegistus, and later - the time of medieval esoteric orders and secret fraternities.

The mystical and metaphysical concepts of the Middle Ages tried to translate into a practical plan adherents of alchemy, who thus hoped to solve life problems. As M. Eliade writes, "one of the central symbols of alchemical hermeticism was the rebis (literally," Two Things ") - the cosmic androgyne, which was depicted as a bisexual human being. His rebirth owes its origin to the

union between the Sun and the Moon. The one who sought such a combination became the actual owner of the philosopher's stone, since the stone also had the name Rebis or "Hermetic androgyn". "Hermetic androgynous" personified the original state "[7, p. 27].

The anthropomistic ideas of the Hermetic philosophy received a new sound in the culture of the Renaissance and the intellectual and spiritual life of Germany. The assimilation of the Hermetic Corps, which became widespread after its translation into Latin in 1471, provided the Western European view with depth and inspiration, linking not only the Renaissance, but also the intellectual and spiritual processes in post-Renaissance Germany into one semantic continuum, where the most favorable situation emerged in the Renaissance. Hermetic philosophy, which was transformed by the theosophical provisions of J. Boehme, existed until the nineteenth century. Germany and since the time of Master Eckhart played a leading role in the European anthropomistic tradition, where Eckhart himself and his students G. Suso and I. Tauler can be attributed to Hegel's words about "devout, spiritualized men" who after Eriugens "continued philosophizing in the spirit of Neoplatonic philosophy which is also called mysticism "[7, p. 152].

This type of philosophizing penetrated into the sphere of liturgical and educational practice and played a rather important role in the formation of the Reformation. The new "way of thinking", which was based on personal religious experiences and intuition, recognized the authority of personal religious feelings, which, only one thing can show a person the degree of his approach to God, brought the reformist discourse closer to the anthropomistic tradition. And as practice has shown, such a style of thinking was not alien to speculative philosophy, which experienced a renaissance of neo-Platonic revival, N. Kuzansky, the first modern philosopher, a consistent successor of the 14th-century mysticism. [7, p. 153].

This German tradition was subject to the reception and assimilation of Hermetic philosophy, finding in it a confirmation of its anthropomistic intuition, which organically and easily even before Ficino's translations was included in N. Kuzansky's philosophy, in fact largely defining the rule of Hermes in the next Renaissance thinking. It can be argued that the ancient religious and philosophical revelations fertilize European thought on the way to the scientific revolution of the XVII century.

Together with German mysticism, as noted by P. Gaidenko, M. Kuzansky was subjected to the influence of a magically occult anthropomistic tradition, which was most vividly expressed by Hermes Threefold, who was considered the predecessor of Moses and saw him as the founder of the religion of salvation - the forerunner of Christ. Hermetic philosophy became widespread, its adherents were: M. Ficino, Pico della Mirandolla, Cornelius Agrippa, Teofrast Paracelsus, Giordano Bruno, Tomaso Campanella and many others [8, p. 138-139].

R. Yeats noted that M. Kuzansky's famous expression: "God is a sphere where the center is everywhere and the circle is nowhere" is taken from a hermetic treatise. In the works of N. Kuzansky, in which a person was elevated to unprecedented heights, there are numerous references to Hermes Trismegistus, for example: "Consider what Hermes Trismegist says: man is the second God, as well. a man is a mortal God, and that the God of heaven is an immortal man "[8, p. 327].

The further development of the Hermetic-Neoplatonic philosophy, an anthropomistic in its essence, was closely connected with the mystical tradition of "common philosophy" (Calvin) in the sense of the unity of the world as the universal life of the spirit that pervades and has manifestation in all objects. According to Paracelsus, the world is understood as a single organism: the macrocosm, the nature of which is contained in eternal unity, and the microcosm (man) are one. Intellectual searches are aimed at the effective search for finding

this life in oneself and in surrounding things. In this context, any activity is now understood as a way of understanding the one. Having embodied "absolute knowledge", an adept can influence nature in accordance with the Highest Law - for this, it is necessary to "get a grasp" of the world, understood as a text consisting of moving "hieroglyphs", "sign", "figures" that do not exist by themselves, but as some kind of "determination". Alchemy, astrology, medicine, numerology, Kabbalah are different, but closely related to each other ways of reading a single "meaning", its comprehension [8, p. 155]. The study of nature is closely connected with mystical contemplation, empiricism becomes the accumulation of spiritual experience by the "transmutation of the inner man" into the hidden essence of the world. Theoretical and cognitive activity is contained in the construction of "emblems", "figures", "symbols", which, as symbolic allegories, simulate various sympathies of "substance" and "essence." These symbolic meanings explain everything that is happening in the world right now, what happened in the past, and will happen in the future. The "signs" themselves (visual, numeric, etc.) appear as having the ability to open the secret as "keys" [8, p. 156].

P. Gaidenko shows, partly through Bruno, and partly due to the influence of German mysticism, on which Kuzanets himself relied, the doctrine of coincidence of opposites becomes the methodological principle of Shelin and Hegel. Hermeticism articulates the middle position between pantheism and the Judeo-Christian concept of God. According to Judeo-Christian doctrines, God is transcendent in relation to the world he created. He is absolutely self-sufficient, he did not create the world with some necessity and would not lose anything if this world did not create. Thus the act of creation itself is essentially unmotivated, a peculiar form of gift. God creates not out of necessity, but out of perfection. This understanding of the nature of God was unsatisfactory for many, because the creation here looks conditional and even somewhat absurd. Pantheism, in turn,

gets rid of the distinction between God and the world so that everything becomes God, thus eliminating the elevated mode of divine being.

Hermeticism appears as a synthesis of the doctrine of the transcendence of God and pantheism: there is a metaphysical difference between God and the world, but God needs the world to achieve completeness and integrity.

In general, it can be noted that Hermetic philosophy turned out to be an ideological constant, which has its own outline of historical evolution from antiquity to modern times. Thus, it can be concluded that hermetic and anthropological Gnosticism became the "cementing enzyme" of the previous path of peace and of God, which reinforced the feeling of its divine conditionality and openness for creative cognitive activity, created an intellectual stream of significant systems of subsequent philosophy.

1.2. Horizons of Hermeneutic discourse

Hermeneutic discourse, if considered in its entirety, as it was planned in the works of the founders, poses many theoretical, general cultural, linguistic and methodological questions to the modern researcher. The very definition of the concepts "interpretation", "understanding", "meaning" causes some difficulties due to the overload of these concepts with meaning, both in historical and cultural retrospect, and in terms of modern scientific and even everyday discourse.

In this sense, hermeneutics is nothing special, unlike other attempts to create a more or less general philosophical methodology, explanatory scheme or system of discourse. Such projects include structuralism, semiotics, psychoanalytic theories, Marxist dialectics, deconstruction, and so on. They also show a tendency to generalize historical and cultural material, a claim to proof and intuitive authenticity, but all these attempts to build a universal methodology were only a partial solution to the question of the method and even to some extent - only an illusion of the method.

The task of this section is to prove that modern philosophical hermeneutics as a methodological project is the final phase of development of classical European philosophy. That is, hermeneutics is not close to other methodological projects (structuralism, semiotics, psychoanalysis), but covers their issues as the most universal, most generalizing discourse.

The universal role of philosophical hermeneutics has been repeatedly emphasized by its creators: F. Astom [9-11], F. Schleiermacher [12; 13-15], W. Dilthey [16-21; 22-26], H. Steinthal [27-28], M. Heidegger [29; 30-41; 42-50], G.-Ґ. Gadamer [51-59; 60-65]. According to these thinkers, philosophical hermeneutics discusses the general problems of understanding. Traditional hermeneutics was first and foremost the "art of understanding", which was engaged in the interpretation of texts. Schleiermacher made a decisive turn to hermeneutics for modern philosophy when he raised the question of the general

conditions for the possibility of understanding. Then Wilhelm Dilthey, developing his theory of interpretationcultural expressions of life, philosophically thoroughly developed the project itself. For Gadamer, hermeneutics does not deal primarily with the methods of the humanities, but with universal models of understanding and interpretation. Universality refers to the range of objects of understanding, to culture as a whole, organized on the basis of language and only then as a methodology. A general sketch of the history of philosophical hermeneutics and the subject range of its ideas is given by E. Tisselton [66; 67]. Also quite important from the point of view of phenomenological and hermeneutic analysis is the work of G.G. Shpeta "Hermeneutics and its problems" [68].

Gadamer emphasizes that the problems of hermeneutics first developed in theology and jurisprudence, and then in the historical sciences. But already the German Romantics came to the conclusion that understanding (Verstehen) and interpretation, as formulated in Dilthey, are relevant not only to the written fixed expressions of life, but also affect the general relationship of people with each other and with the world. This is manifested in the terms used, for example, in the word "Verständnis" - understanding. In German, the very word "Verstehen" means, among other things, "to have consent to something." Thus, the possibility and necessity of understanding is the main action of man, which assumes the main burden of its social life with other people, especially on the path leading through language and reciprocity of communication. Therefore, according to the philosopher, the universality of the claims of hermeneutics is beyond any doubt.

On the other hand, the "language" (language burden, immersion in language) of the event of understanding, which takes place between people, means an almost insurmountable obstacle, which was first noticed by German romantics and evaluated positively at first. It can be formulated in one sentence: "Individuum est ineffabile" (individual unspeakable) [64, p. 24-25].

Today, hermeneutics is represented by three relatively independent branches or areas of discourse. This discipline at its origins was positioned not only as a general theory of understanding and interpretation, but also as a methodology that can shed light on the fundamental problems of the humanities, to develop universal tools that have high heuristic value. These two approaches to the understanding of hermeneutics (ie as a general theory and methodology) were very quickly supplemented by the third direction - separate hermeneutic research conducted in the field of humanities. The subject of interpretation and understanding, the principles of constructing schemes of interpretation are widely used in linguistics, cultural studies, history, literature, in various related disciplines linking psychoanalysis, social anthropology, logic and philology, structuralist theories and cognitivism.

These studies proved to be quite viable and also gained some popularity. At the same time, what hermeneutics began with as a philosophical discipline remained in a state of uncertainty, the idea of understanding and its horizons did not go beyond the general provisions and eventually became another circle in the development of metaphysics.

Now more relevant than ever the words of F. Schleiermacher, said by him about hermeneutics, as the art of understanding does not yet exist in general form, but only as a set of special hermeneutics [69, p. 41]. We can say that philosophical hermeneutics today is preserved only because there is more than one such theory with a clearly defined subject area, but there are numerous hermeneutic studies with more or less clear tasks, each of which seeks to explore the problem of understanding in terms of a particular philosophical position. For example, psychoanalysis has long been considered as a specific hermeneutic theory, and numerous researchers often emphasize the barely noticeable similarity of these methods, the intersection of which is the study of the trace. The situation of dialogue that arises between the psychoanalyst and the analyst is very reminiscent

of hermeneutic discourse, when the interpreter tries to find the meaning hidden in some cultural product.

This comparison of philosophical hermeneutics and psychoanalysis does not withstand criticism, because these two research procedures are located on different sides of the circle of understanding or come from completely different methodological positions. Although the study of the difference or coincidence of these methods is the task of a separate study. Note that psychoanalysis, which can be considered as a whole psychoanalytic movement, is a more or less well-veiled reductionist methodology, the main purpose of which is to reduce the various manifestations of human mental activity to several key topics that constantly revolve around instincts. In fact, psychoanalytic techniques act as a specific machine of interpretation, which rotates the analyst rotation by rotation in a closed circle of interpretation, achieving some standard, predictable result. It is a machine that reduces and simplifies meanings, which is essentially a closed system and thus diametrically opposed to the goals and objectives of hermeneutics. The latter acts as an open discursive system, a mechanism that unfolds meaning, a network that captures subtle noematic connections that are congenial to the thematic structure of consciousness.

All of the above can to a greater extent be attributed to other reduction schemes of interpretation, which are represented by structuralism and semiotics, which by definition are focused on finding invariant structures and sign complexes that build simplified schemes of interpretation of complex semantic phenomena. Now we are not talking about the disadvantages or possibilities of each of these methods, but only that each methodology has its own field of interpretation and its own specific discourse, due to the range of tasks and features of each theoretical position.

Hermeneutic methodology and the hermeneutic discourse itself by definition avoids any form of reductionism, and in this capacity is a direct

continuation and logical development of the range of ideas of classical Western European metaphysics. in a broader sense. Suffice it to mention the Delphic oracle, in fact, the cult of interpretation, the prophecies of the Sibyls and their significance for ancient culture, the figure of Hermes, one of the most important functions of which was the interpretation of the will of the gods. It is no exaggeration to say that all ancient culture and philosophy are permeated with spiritual interpretation and understanding, for example, Plato's dialectic with its six methods and is nothing more than a hermeneutic technique.

General hermeneutics is difficult to determine its place, for almost the same reason that it is difficult to indicate the place and philosophy itself in the system of human knowledge. Special or private hermeneutics and in essence, and in its discourse are only sums of comments and do not meet any scientific requirements, that is, in fact, do not meet the purpose for which in general was created hermeneutics itself.

Issues related to the emergence and development of philosophical hermeneutics have repeatedly been the subject of consideration both within hermeneutics itself and by numerous critics in this area. For a meaningful scientific analysis of this critique, it is necessary to more or less clearly distinguish works in which hermeneutics itself is understood too broadly, as almost any reflection on the meaning of anything, whatever it is, about art or situations of everyday communication. All the more important to draw at least a conditional boundary that separates the actual philosophical hermeneutics from theological exegesis, aimed at interpreting the sacred texts of different religions and religious denominations. Nor should we interfere in the realm of historical interpretations, in which the hermeneutic method is increasingly used. Finally, it is necessary to clearly see the difference between philosophical hermeneutics and various psychological interpretations, the traditional methodology of which for more than a hundred years is psychoanalysis in its various versions or similar areas.

The most consistent and systematic critic of the hermeneutic method and hermeneutics as such is analytical philosophy as a descendant of positivism of the nineteenth century. Scientific empiricism, which to this day is an integral part of analytical philosophy, as well as logicism, which began to develop in the early twentieth century, are the main strategies for criticizing metaphysics. It is the metaphysical component of hermeneutics, or rather, hermeneutics itself, understood as metaphysics, that is being attacked by analysts. What are the main claims to philosophical hermeneutics from the standpoint of supporters of a clear scientific discourse? First of all, it is uncertainty, blurring of the basic concepts of hermeneutics: meaning, understanding, interpretation, etc.

This is partly due to the really complex and contradictory nature of these concepts. Any attempt to give a clear and unambiguous definition of them reveals some irresistible semantic residue that cannot be defined and falls outside the scope of precise definitions. In turn, attempts to formulate the most general (philosophical) definition of meaning suffer from the excessiveness characteristic of philosophical discourse and, as a consequence, the absence of any applied meaning. It should be noted that hermeneutics has always sought to use parallels and analogy with philology, at least to give the appearance of a clearer discourse to their constructions. Unfortunately, these attempts, even despite their wit, remain quite external and arbitrary in relation to the merits. As an example we can point to the theory of G. Asta, in which hermeneutics acts as a continuation of grammar and philological criticism [70].

Conventionally, we can say that philosophical hermeneutics is a philosophy for philosophers themselves. Interpretation is a procedure that never ends, it is a kind of contemplation of the observer, which contemplates the object of contemplation. It is a logical and semantic collision that is reflected at different times in different cultures. Hermeneutics asserts not only a certain autonomy of the text from its creator, its conditional independence, inner life, but also the activity of cultural products, which themselves act as an agent of influence. What

the interpreter interprets interprets himself. In this regard, I would like to mention the famous phrase of Nietzsche: "if you look into the abyss for a long time, the abyss also looks at you." The inexhaustibility of the semantic potential of cultural products, their fundamental incompleteness makes hermeneutics a fairly popular methodology.

This is what radically distinguishes hermeneutics from reductionist schemes of interpretation, from excessive scientism, psychologism, sociologism, economism, and so on. All attempts to clarify philosophical meanings through various forms of human activity, to "hem" philosophy to one of them failed. It is hermeneutics that tries to clarify philosophy through its inherent open search for truth, its uneasiness over what has been achieved, its constant self-renewal and even self-denial.

The meaning that hermeneutics seeks to find here does not refer only to nature or only to human activity, to the activity of the imagination, although we can speak of the truth of natural things in themselves, especially where we are talking about living nature. Describing this approach, it should be noted that meaning is found here in at least four main positions, moving from natural to purely mental and cultural forms. Also in the structure of the meaning itself we can distinguish the constantly present binarism, which, in fact, prevents the creation of a full and adequate to the expectations of the general theory of hermeneutics. Today, such theories are possible only in general, as well as in local studies, each of which creates its own kind of hermeneutic discourse, based on the specifics of the material with which it deals. As an example, we can point to the impeccable analysis of Plato's ethics, conducted by G.-Г. Gadamer [65].

Perhaps this duality is the most obvious and old problem faced by hermeneutics at all stages of its development, a problem whose origins can be traced back to the ancient science of philosophy. Here we can confidently point to the tradition of the Platonic Academy and the school of the Stoics.

It is hermeneutics that acts as a theory and a general methodology for understanding everything that forms the basis of a person's spiritual life. In our work we will defend the thesis that hermeneutics, by its nature, constantly tends to metaphysics in the sense that Heidegger invested in this term, as well as to idealism, because it is impossible or very difficult to interpret the spiritual, ideal, semantic formations, not recognizing their fundamental autonomy and difference from another nature.

A separate problem can be considered the question of the possibility of hermeneutics in the framework of materialism or in modern scientific methodology. With regard to materialism, we can mention Marxist anthropology, in which the key role is played by the concept of alienation, which goes through certain stages, from simple economic appropriation to the transformation of the spiritual state of man. It is the interpretation of the latter in the theory of alienation and loss of one's spiritual characteristics and misunderstanding of oneself that makes Marxism, if not hermeneutics in the full sense, then a kind of theory of understanding.

The specificity of Marxism and neo-Marxism is that they are almost entirely social. They have always felt a lack of ontological and epistemological constructions, as a lack of primary, archaic interpretations of the living world. This is not surprising, if you "complete" Marxism to the level of ontology, it risks becoming its opposite (remember Engels and his conversation with Plekhanov on substance). Inattention to individual consciousness, to mental phenomena and to their uniqueness, which is inherent in Marxism as a whole, makes it not a very suitable environment for the creation of philosophical hermeneutics. Although some works of modern Marxists, including Guy Deborah or F. Jamison, could act as such.

Let us consider the position of L. Wittgenstein of the period of "Philosophical Studies", in which there are prerequisites for the convergence of

analytical philosophy and the understanding of the meaning inherent in philosophical hermeneutics.

Of particular importance in this regard are the classical concepts and at the same time the procedures of hermeneutics - interpretation, explanation and understanding. Hermeneutics often raises inappropriate questions, as a student who suddenly realizes that the teacher omits (often due to personal misunderstanding) , he just walks by, telling the children some ready-made truths. We get lost when children or interlocutors ask simple inappropriate questions. Why can't we divide by zero; what is green; what is "I", and whether we mean the same thing when we say "I"; why do we use the same grammar to describe real things and fictional objects? If to save money, then why not save on synonyms, ambiguity, metaphors, omissions, etc. The answer is possible: because our language preserves a deep, unconscious layer of our nature, our past, in which we do not so rigidly divide the world into real and fictional, where dreams and heroes of myths and legends are as real as ourselves.

Man is able to understand only what he is now, and at every moment, but this is a fairly common and quite complex illusion - the creation and understanding of meaning in relation to itself. We simply think over words and believe that any experience or mental manifestation, any thought has a presumption of meaning and comprehension.

As the experience of phenomenological interpretation shows, first in E. Husserl, then in M. Heidegger in his analysis of Dasein, man has only a vague, uncertain experience of being himself and without the use of special forms of hermeneutic discourse is unable to find its true meaning. From Husserl's point of view, we are in the so-called "world of life" (Lebenswelt), which consists of the sum of direct data that determine the forms of orientation and behavior [see 320]. Such obvious phenomena of the logical plan of the primary layer of any consciousness, they act as a basis, a condition for the possibility of conscious

acceptance by the individual of theoretical attitudes. These possibilities coincide with the realm of well-known ideas that have the character of ideological automatisms, unconscious origins of meaning-making.

Everyone really has difficulty when he wants to subject phenomenological reflection to this whole phenomenal series. At the same time, it is his personal states that are unique to his and only he can be an expert in their interpretation. But this initial interpretation is not clear enough, it requires additional mechanisms, consistent implementation of all stages of phenomenological reduction in order to find meaning as a definite result, and not start with it as a reliable phenomenological source. If people could so easily say that they know and instantly, without undue effort find meaning in their immediate experiences, the very talk of the need for hermeneutics would be superfluous.

We can lose this need only if we lose our individuality. In fact, it is present in world culture, for example, in Buddhism, where there is no reason to think, and whether my personal enlightenment is similar to the enlightenment of the Buddha or it is different, maybe he was more enlightened, and my enlightenment is false. Here, any individuality - fiction, myth, point of view is quite popular in modern culture. But we are not at all inclined to use the word "myth", which in recent years has become nonsense and has become a substitute for the phrase "anything." In addition, none of those who like to use this word, and did not explain what, in fact, is the mythological nature of my experiences, my consciousness or mathematics, for example. Generally speaking, not every abstraction, idealization or just fiction can be a myth. We believe that a myth is not a phenomenon that can be pointed at, rather, it is a function inherent in some phenomena under certain circumstances. For example, Greek myths were them in ancient Greece, but now they do not perform this function and, strictly speaking, are not myths. For most people, these are just sometimes funny and sometimes boring stories, at best, with some ethical or historical basis. It is also possible that, like language, a myth cannot be purely individual, personal, that is, I can usually come up with

something that resembles language, I can write my notes on it or even start thinking about it, but it will always be something insufficient.

The same with the myth. Any fiction and fantasy, no matter how a person believes in them, will remain just the nuances of their own psyche. Everyone has a lot of absolutely incredible fantasies (especially in the so-calledchanged states of consciousness), long formalized in a system, but clearly shows the difference between them and myth, as a function of social and cultural discourses. Even a person who can not tolerate any community, sociality, still is not autonomous and can not create their own, in-itself-and-for-themselves culture, mythology, language. There is something ant in human culture as a whole, we are either working ants of culture or its soldiers, but no one, not even Plato or Shakespeare, is its producer. In other words, language, myth, culture as such do not have a creator - the people do not create their mythology and their culture, it arises with it.

In principle, it is not enough to rely on an everyday understanding of hermeneutics in order to be able to interpret mythology, or what can serve as a myth. Myth functions not only in the field of poetry, or in any kind of social discourse. Fundamental to understanding the myth is that the latter functions only or almost exclusively in a taboo system.

Unlike Husserl, Heidegger has his own vision of a pre-phenomenological or "pre-hermeneutic" subject.

In Heidegger's ontology, it is important to contrast the concept of Dasein with the concept of subject in the neo-European sense, because Dasein, in its ontological definition, is still a thinking substance, it is only a prerequisite for subjectivity. The philosopher points out that the axis of being (Dasein) understands itself in some way and with some clarity in its being. It is characteristic of this being that with his being and through him this being is open to him. The intelligibility of being itself is the existential certainty of being-being.

That is, the conditions and intellectual meaning of Dasein's existence include an ontology, or concept of being as such. And this ontological thinking of itself is not achieved in the experience of existence, but is present at first, in the finished form, as a legacy: and grew in it. From it it constantly understands itself in the closest way and in the known sphere. This intelligence unlocks the possibilities of his existence and controls them. His "to him - and this always means his" generation "- the past was here and there, but always goes before him" [72, p. 45].

With these words, Heidegger, following Husserl, decisively breaks with the enlightening concept of consciousness in the form of a pure tablet (tabula rasa). Any consciousness is always historical, conditioned by the past. In this position one can see the advancement of the Cartesian "thought" (cogito) towards Kant. In the sense that the way of thinking, and the organization of thinking, as a variety of places of conceivable things, contain a priori and rooted in the past. These a priori, according to Heidegger, "open up the possibilities" of thinking and give it directions and ways of movement.

Heidegger reproduces for the first time what Foucault later called "the hermeneutics of the subject." He understands the relationship between ontological and hermeneutic issues, the intersection of which is the concept of Dasein. Heidegger establishes the need for hermeneutics to understand the essence of human existence and the essence of philosophical discourse. It was Heidegger who completed the theoretical work that had been done during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. and made possible the formation of basic concepts of philosophical hermeneutics. His discovery is that the hermeneutic position is naturally embedded in the structure of Dasein and its subsequent specifications and findings. This approach makes philosophical hermeneutics a fundamental ontological theory. This is the fundamental difference between hermeneutics and other methodological approaches.

Thus, philosophical hermeneutics acts as a natural continuation of the development of European metaphysics, its traditional problems in the field of complex, multilevel structure of meaning and semantic activity. The realm of meaning-making and meaning-making is, by definition, a new vision of ontology, its new content and the meaning of the existence of hermeneutics as a general philosophical methodology.

The general sketch or the general scheme of development of modern hermeneutics and its problems can look as follows. At the first stage, hermeneutics serves as an auxiliary discipline and a set of practices and techniques of interpretation in the field of theology and, later, in classical philology. It was during this period that the first attempts were made to define hermeneutics as such, to find its place in a number of other sciences, and to give hermeneutics a philosophical sound for the first time. This important fundamental work was done precisely and almost exclusively in German philosophy, more broadly, in German humanitarian culture in the second half of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The gradual development of humanities, especially philology and history, as well as the rapid development of psychology, which at that time was rapidly gaining weight and popularity, led to numerous projects of theories of interpretation in these areas, as well as numerous interactions and theoretical borrowings. contributed to the general development of hermeneutics. Among such influences we note the theory of language and the philosophical vision of culture of W. von Humboldt, who first gave the theory of language a truly philosophical status.

This process culminated in the emergence of hermeneutic discourse in two new areas (new to the two traditional ones - theology and philology) - historical, which is associated with the philosophical work of W. Dilthey and psychological, which existed in at least two main forms. These are psychoanalysis with its techniques of personality interpretation and introspective psychology, first of all, the work of W. Wundt and the general attitude to the fundamental impossibility

of transmitting the subjective experience of an individual who needs special techniques of interpretation.

In general, all these concepts created a joint effort in the second stage of a very amorphous, but quite recognizable group of discursive practices, which can be called philosophical hermeneutics, which now occupies its rightful place in a number of new philosophical theories.

A new stage in the development of hermeneutics is associated with the development of phenomenological philosophy, which gave philosophical hermeneutics a new and fundamentally important impetus for development. Hermeneutics has since turned to the consideration of the structures of consciousness and, above all, the structures of meaning formation and meaning itself and its functioning in the field of intersubjectivity. This task remains before philosophical hermeneutics to this day, so it still acts as a descendant of the phenomenological method. Modern hermeneutics does not need to go back to Husserl, it is already constantly receiving the ideas of the creator of phenomenology.

Thus, so far hermeneutics has passed three stages of its development: formational, then - the stage of methodological and technical maintenance of the humanities and phenomenological, when it has become a universal metaphysical theory that meets the pressing problems and demands of modern philosophy.

Our interpretations, which reach a certain level, always run into a certain barrier. We are not inclined to mystify this phenomenon and believe that these limitations have a very rational explanation. For example, it can be noted that we have always been and probably will be limited in understanding the thoughts and feelings of another person. This is a certain hermeneutic horizon for our interpretation. The second limitation is often the belonging of the meaning to be found to another culture, especially when it comes to ancient times and cultures that have disappeared. All these things are quite clear, in fact, the hermeneutic

horizon is a metaphor for the limitations of our knowledge and our interpretations of our own consciousness and our habits, beyond which we will never go.

It is a completely different matter when we ask ourselves whether we are able to understand ourselves and what it means in general - understanding oneself is probably not the same as understanding another person. This is a problem that is inherent in psychoanalytic theories and its importance should also be recognized for philosophical hermeneutics. What exactly slips out of the interpreter's arms when he tries to understand himself? Where in the depths of our own consciousness is this horizon of interpretation?

In some respects, our task was also to understand these limitations and to reveal the possibilities of further development of hermeneutic discourse.

2. DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN HERMENEUTIC DISCOURSE IN GERMANY

2.1. **Influence of Heidigger and Gadamer on the development of modern German hermeneutics**

The development of philosophical hermeneutics in XX century went beyond German philosophy, also overcoming a certain philological orientation. From a method that was designed, in essence, to serve the historical, philological and religious discourse, hermeneutics has become an independent philosophical discipline that reflects the very essence of metaphysical issues. First of all, such a change is associated with the development of the phenomenological tradition and especially with the works of M. Heidegger, who managed to free hermeneutics from the excessive influence of language theories and put it at the heart of metaphysical inquiry. This, of course, does not mean that the language itself has been given over to philosophical oblivion, it is only a matter of changing accents and research attitudes.

At the same time, the development of hermeneutics continued within the framework of philological discourse, leading to a certain separation from metaphysics and the emergence of criticism by linguists. In these studies, the development of hermeneutic issues took place against the background of the emergence of structuralist theory and methodology, as well as the philosophy of language of the Brentan school. In this process, the works of A. Marty (1847-1914) stand out [73; 74; 75; 76] and X. Steinthal (1823-1999) [77; 78]. Thus, a very high assessment of the scientific work of A. Marty gives a modern researcher of this school RA Gromov: "Marty's philosophy of language is an essential moment in the development of linguistics of the 20th century, without which it is hardly possible to give an adequate picture of the transformation of research in these areas at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.

If A. Marty acts as a forerunner of the structuralist and phenomenological method, H. Steinthal maximally expands the understanding of language in the field of psychological interpretations, thus being one of the most outspoken psychologists in the field of linguistics, as G. Shpet says in his history of hermeneutics [79, p. 358]. Thus, hermeneutics as a branch of scientific theorizing simultaneously developed in several directions, which did not contribute to its unified understanding. The vision of hermeneutics as a single scientific theory had to take into account all these numerous impulses emanating from the phenomenological school, from the philosophy of M. Heidegger and the fundamental ontological questions that he put in the first place, as well as from philological-critical knowledge and experience of reading and interpretation of texts, which was accumulated by classical philology.

This task, in our opinion, was set and largely solved by G.Gadamer, in any case, if we accept his theoretical position on the transcendence of the meaning of the interpreter. In this section we consider the works of Gadamer hermeneutics, based not only on his fundamental work "Truth and Method" [80; also 38], but also on the comprehension and interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy, in particular - the texts of Plato [81; 82].

Gadamer understands philosophical hermeneutics as an important stage in the development of European thought. That is why in the work of the philosopher so much space is given to the analysis and interpretation of European cultural heritage, which in no way denies, but allows and formalizes other philosophical disciplines: ontology, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics and others.

The formation of the circle of ideas that formed the basis of philosophical hermeneutics of G. Gadamer is inseparable from ideas about the essence of language and understanding of its role in shaping the meaning and all spiritual culture of mankind, as well as ideas about human individuality, its creation and development. Consideration of such issues is fundamental to identify the real role

that the hermeneutic project has played and continues to play in the development of European philosophy.

The urgency of this question is due to the role that the philosophical project of G. Gadamer plays a role in the development of modern ideas about the importance of humanitarian knowledge and above all, philosophy in the formation of man as such. Over time, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics only increases its significance for the development of philosophical discourse, thus confirming its great heuristic potential. The development of the issue of understanding, first of all, the understanding of the semantic component of human activity in various fields - from the sphere of art to political discourse - is more important than ever in modern Ukrainian philosophy. But today we can see some limitations in understanding the meaning and relevance of Gadamer's legacy, the study of which is often formal, the thinker and his work are mentioned as a kind of "silent figure", without the necessary reflection and further development.

Thanks to Heidegger and Husserl, German philosophy made a very important turn in the twentieth century. To quote Husserl: this is the transition from the world of science to the world of life. It is in this plane that Gadamer understands hermeneutics, for whom it is the activity of a person or a human community that involves understanding or interpreting both a test and what can be perceived as a text. Thus, historically philological hermeneutics occupies

first place among these activities: if a person did not know the language and could not therefore understand the texts, he could not understand everything else.

The traditional subject of hermeneutics is the understanding - judgment and development of semantic horizons, which are presented in textual forms. Texts can be written in natural languages, as well as in conditional texts of other arts. In a conditional sense, the text is any trace of purposeful human activity - life, architecture, other plastic arts, etc. It is hermeneutics from the standpoint of Gadamer and is a way of reading and interpreting texts, and it is the methodology

of working with texts allows you to create ways to interpret all other cultural phenomena.

Gadamer constantly emphasizes that hermeneutics, as a humanities methodology, cannot be a set of rules as in the natural sciences. This is what Kant calls the ability to judge. No scientific methods are achieved here, there is only one scale of evaluation - the specific accuracy of the agreement, the guarantee of semantic reconciliation, which is achieved in the process of practical agreement. Hermeneutics is a specific practice.

The philosopher formulates a special truth of hermeneutics - a truth that no one can know and communicate. Thus, from the very beginning, hermeneutics acts as a specific correlate of social consciousness, which is expressed in the search for meaning and focused on common interpretation and understanding. Against this background, Gadamer's understanding of the forms of aesthetic consciousness most fully reflected in the experience of art is based. The philosopher expresses the truth obtained by the romantic school that art is a true organ (ie mode of action, tool) of philosophy and, perhaps, its rival, which surpasses academic philosophy in all senses [83, p. 256].

Gadamer in his scientific research has always been a representative of the classical tradition, so it is not surprising that much of his legacy is devoted to the interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy and literature. In this sense, his theoretical views are very close to the position of M. Heidegger, who "discovered" that we can reproduce the philosophical thoughts of the Greeks:

In the example of Plato and Aristotle it became possible to learn because any philosophical thinking is a further reflection of the initial experience of the world, that it seeks to fully comprehend the energy of concepts and contemplations of the language in which we are "[83, p. 258].

From Gadamer's point of view, Heidegger creates a hermeneutics of reality, a self-interpretation of actual human existence. This is the source of Gadamer's

hermeneutics: "... the hermeneutic aspect can not be limited to hermeneutic sciences - art, history, can not be limited to communication with texts: the universality of the hermeneutic problem, which was already aimed at Schleiermacher, belong to the totality of all reasonable" [83, p. 260].

In his vision of hermeneutics, as well as the whole philosophy, G. Gadamer acts as a kind of innovator-conservative, who understands very well the specifics of the humanities and the fundamental fact that the humanities by definition are outdated, sophisticated. They are rather scholastic, but not technical. Here, of course, one can argue, but it is impossible to deny the philosopher a deep insight into the essence of the question. The history of spiritual culture does not coincide with the history of its material, economic or political development. This also applies to the development of natural and mathematical sciences, where the rule applies - the more modern - the more correct, accurate, more true. Indeed, ancient mathematics is now taught in high school, and the level of modern physics would be beyond perception in the ancient world. The development of ancient science is of interest only to its historians and is not relevant in the development of modern achievements.

According to Gadamer, the study of the spiritual history of mankind, its art, literature, and philosophy has a very different form. Homer is not relevant in any modern application. We read ancient poetry, we study the philosophy of the Greeks, perceiving them as a value in itself, as something that does something to man himself, and is not used to solve urgent problems. Therefore, Gadamer explains in the first pages of his main work that the history of philosophy in a sense is not history, but expresses the original human desire for the highest spiritual ups and downs, for the highest ideals [83, p. 256-257].

For G. Gadamer, who consistently defended the ontological aspect of the problem of understanding, hermeneutics is a field of practice. It is realized as an activity of comprehension, for example, as a practice of comprehending the text. The

interpretation of hermeneutics as a doctrine of being has the character of a kind of general philosophy of understanding, the subject of which is not only the science of spirit, but in general the whole set of knowledge about the world and being, and being for Gadamer, as for Heidegger. In connection with this attitude is the most important premise of Gadamer's hermeneutics: there can be no non-historical point of view from which the researcher could look at history as an object of external analysis. Hermeneutics must inevitably move in the circle of historical tradition. Only such a position allows to penetrate into the living body of the material being studied, guarantees a reduction in the distance between the researcher and the content of spiritual formations.

Philosophical hermeneutics initially carried an ontological meaning, even if such a task was not immediately set. The connection between language and ontology was first described in Plato's Cratil, in the naive etymology of Socrates, which indicates the connection of words and their meanings with some real and ideal being. Strictly speaking, the meaning of any hermeneutics is to establish such a connection by virtue of the general philosophical and methodological attitudes of the thinker. The second striking attempt to present the ontology of language in connection with the search for meaning and interpretation is the philosophy of the Stoics in their doctrine of lecton.

In the Stoics, thought not only joins the idea, but itself creates a sign and a lecton, which are two forms of semantic transformation of what is meant. Thus, the Stoic lecton is a rather important ontological-semantic innovation, a term denoting a conditional, semantic object that has its own special characteristics. Undoubtedly, the lecton is a kind of analogue of the Platonic idea, with the huge difference that the lecton is not only not primary in relation to the thing, but also indifferent to it, does not affect the thing, but in some way expresses it.

The Stoic lecton, being an ontological concept, is not a thing, a thought, or an idea. Perhaps this is the same conditional and elusive component of the sign that

eludes the networks of analysts and reductionists, making it impossible to fully, comprehensively describe and define the sign as something completely objective. Something that does not exist in reality, but fundamental for understanding the process of interpretation - is a lecton. Therefore, in the Stoic philosophy of language, the connection between the lecton and the thing, between which there is undoubtedly a correspondence and even a certain similarity, remains unclear, but it can be perceived as relatively accidental and optional.

This impression is not misleading at all, because the lecton is autonomous from all other components of the sign and can have its own characteristics, as well as its own existence. For example, a lecton can exist after the existence of a thing, in situations where the thing was destroyed, disappeared, and so on. Nowadays, there is a lecton named "Plato", of course, different from a particular person who lived in antiquity .

Gadamer's work on the reconstruction of the meaning of ancient philosophy reflects his concept of understanding, which, like Heidegger's works , is a way of human existence. This is how Heidegger explores Plato's notion of truth, which gives us a model of ontic hermeneutics [84; 85], which is also used by Gadamer. Gadamer's work on the reconstruction of the meaning of ancient philosophy reflects his concept of understanding, which, like Heidegger's works , is a way of human existence. This is how Heidegger explores Plato's notion of truth, which gives us a model of ontic hermeneutics [84; 85], which is also used by Gadamer.

Gadamer very broadly interprets the hermeneutic phenomenon itself, in which he sees the integral unity of the three aspects - understanding, interpretation and application. Gadamer asserts their inseparability, their factual identity: understanding is always an interpretation and always involves the application of what is to be understood. Gadamer's notion of application outlines the limits of the phenomenon to be interpreted and establishes the fact that all the phenomena of spiritual culture in a given situation must be understood differently.

In this regard, Gadamer is quite original in clarifying the meaning and content of education. From his point of view, the essence of education is self-return to oneself, the precondition of which is alienation. [86, p. 56-57].

Gadamer essentially continues and completes the tradition of ontologizing hermeneutics, partly imitating his predecessors, first of all -M. Heidegger, in part pointing to the a priori ontological meaning of any possible philosophical theory of language.

A fundamental issue for any philosophical hermeneutics is the problem of establishing the truth about the process of interpretation and its results. Gadamer sees this as a problem that he tries to solve by referring to the experience of the ancient tradition, both philosophical and rhetorical, in which the statement εὖλέγειν - traditionally meant speaking true, correct, and not just the ability to say something good [86, p. 56-57]. The ancient ideal of eulogy is a model for all attempts to build a theory of understanding and interpretation, a model that is based primarily on human natural intuition and is not subject to any scientific proof.

In general, it is very noticeable that Gadamer devotes a significant part of his text to appeals to the common sense, which indicates the impossibility of substantiating the hermeneutic position. The basis of the process of interpretation is what the philosopher calls hermeneutic conversation (hermeneutischen Gespräch) [86, p.461].

In this regard, Gadamer describes a hermeneutic situation that arises only in the process of attaching the individual subjectivity of the interpreter to historical life: "Thinking can turn as a source to this wealth that has been accumulated for him by language itself. This is what Plato does, which is based on previous logical work done for him in the language itself. This is confirmed by looking at its original history, especially the theory of formation of concepts in the tradition of the Academy. Yes, we have seen that Plato's requirement to rise above the

empiricism of names implies the fundamental independence of the world of ideas of rejection. However, because the rise of names leads to ideas and understands itself as a dialectic, ie is a meticulous view (Heraussehen), common along with what happens and as a compatible, single view (Zusammensehen), which is unique to the species, as it follows the natural direction, which follows and the language itself. The rise above the nature of names only indicates that the truth of things is not in names. This does not mean that you can do without names and without a logo. Plato has always acknowledged that it is impossible to do without these intermediaries, although they are not perfect. But it is impossible to know the idea, the true existence of things, other than with the support of such intermediaries. But we ask ourselves, is there knowledge of the idea itself as such, in its concreteness and singularity? Isn't the essence of things as whole as language itself? " [80, p. 401].

Thus, Gadamer defends a classical and rather conservative position, which brings his interpretation of hermeneutics closer to Platonism, as well as to a certain rigor in relation to language. He understands human language as the language of reason itself, and linguistic interpretation as a form of interpretation in general. To do this, Gadamer uses a special conceptual series: Deutung; Disposal; Interpretation; Erläuterung (meaning, interpretation, comment) [80, p. 402-404]. In a sense, Gadamer approaches the concept of the ideal language of Leibniz, although it is far from the analytical and logical rigor of the latter, as it defends the fundamental metaphor of linguistic consciousness [86, p. 498] .

In the world of what has been said, it is impossible not to mention the critique of Gadamer's hermeneutic project. It is very easy to see in Gadamer's hermeneutics a conservative desire to rehabilitate tradition, an uncritical submission to a certain authority. Criticism of hermeneutics was also heard from the representatives of modern communicative philosophy, in particular, from J. Habermas, which concerned the possibility of combining hermeneutic methodology with an objective attitude. The theory of communicative action, which was developed by

the latter, takes into account the fact that interpreters are in one way or another involved in social interaction, and therefore are by no means neutral observers. Habermas's understanding acts as an important moment in the social process, which is subordinated to the public interest.

Within this section, it is not possible to respond to all critical remarks about Gadamer's philosophical position, but it should be noted that any social reflection on hermeneutics cannot fully cover its tasks in the field of metaphysics, just as and the hermeneutic project itself is the final phase of the development of metaphysics. The last from the time of Aristotle is understood as knowledge of the essence of things, which cannot be grasped or transformed into any kind of social discourse. It is this orientation of Gadamer's philosophical project that makes hermeneutics relatively autonomous from fleeting psychological, social, and political encroachments and attempts to put it at the service of certain public interests.

2.2. Ontognoseological turn of Gadamer from language to the newest understanding of history

Gadamer and his philosophical hermeneutics completes a certain stage in the development of a form of philosophical and metaphysical discourse, which connects it with the fundamental-ontological relationship. The latter phrase is not used by chance, it refers to Heidegger's philosophy of the period of "turn" and his idea of the true, essential history of the world, the history of the world as being (das Seyn).

Gadamer constantly points to the fact that he did not seek to create a method that cancels all the previous ones or allows you to answer all the questions. He seeks to consider the transcendental foundations of the very possibility of interpretation and understanding of texts. Gadamer's innovation is not that he offers a new solution to ontological or methodological problems, but in the special use of Heidegger's philosophy, in its specific application to the understanding of the relationship between the latent isomorphism of ontology, history, and language.

There is no doubt that Gadamer returns to the origins of ontology in its historical plane, he radicalizes Heidegger's position and reduces it to the hermeneutic means that follow language and its semantic formations.

Gadamer makes an ontological turn of hermeneutics, presented in his key work "Truth and Method". To understand how this ontological or universal turn of hermeneutics actually takes place, it is necessary to move on to the original problem of work, on the question of the conformity of hermeneutics to the humanities as a whole or any of them separately.

The idea of an eternal, reliable foundation arises from man's escape from his own temporality. The idea of absolute truth arises from the suppression or oblivion of this temporality.

Heidegger views the structure of our vague initial idea as a positive ontological characteristic of understanding in order to develop the ability to perceive ourselves based on our situation. Thus, Heidegger overcame the epistemological problem of historicism. It is not a question of the ghost of universal support, a product of positivism, but of an awareness of existence that must be overcome in relation to the possibilities at its disposal.

Heidegger, who devoted himself to the development of his hermeneutically more radical approach, left behind the problem of historicism, and with it the methodology of the humanities as the successor of V. Dilthey, and demonstrates the instability of the idea of universally reliable knowledge on the example of the sciences of understanding and thus shows the failure of historicism. Heidegger's critical discussion of the problems of historicism became one of Gadamer's main tasks.

Until 1959, Gadamer gave seven lectures entitled "Introduction to the Humanities", in which he developed a hermeneutics. The results of these lectures was published in 1960, the book "Truth and Method" self-reflection of the humanities compared to the natural sciences. Gadamer argues that contrary to the ideas supported by historicism and positivism, it is necessary for the humanities to develop their own methods to obtain the status of science.

This hope was the core around which all the methodological efforts of Gadamer's predecessors revolved, who fundamentally questioned this starting point and wondered whether the pursuit of methods that ensure the commonality of scientific knowledge really took place in the humanities. Gadamer initially focused on the speech of the naturalist Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1894) on the relationship between the natural sciences and the humanities in Heidelberg in 1862. In it, the natural sciences are characterized by methods of logical induction, which derives rules and laws from empirical material collected earlier.

The humanities sciences do it differently. They come to their knowledge through something like the psychological involvement of the interpreter. Helmholtz speaks of "artistic induction," which arises from instinctive feeling or tact, but for which there are no definite rules. Perhaps this scientist could best understand the meaning of Gadamer's work.

Helmholtz believes that there is no separate humanitarian method. At the same time, in order to pay tribute to the humanities, he pointed out their specifics absolutely correctly, especially noted memory and authority, and spoke about the psychological tact that takes the place of rational proof here.

Gadamer agrees with Helmholtz that the humanities are generally much more concerned with the practice of rhythm than with any method. For a long time in the humanities there was a debate that the humanities will somehow find their own methods to reach the level of natural sciences. Gadamer in Truth and Method makes a fundamental critique of methodological obsession with concern for the scientific nature of the humanities. Therefore, Gadamer's initial thesis is that the scientific nature of the humanities "can be understood more from the tradition of the concept of education than from the idea of modern science" [80, p. 23].

This is the meaning of the appeal to the humanistic tradition at the beginning of his book. Within this tradition, terms have been developed that can meet the requirements of the humanities. According to Gadamer, this tradition existed before Kant, before it was supplanted by the heterogeneous rule of the concept of method. Thus, Gadamer must explore the question "how this tradition came to an end and how the claim to truth in the humanities got to a level of methodological thinking of modern science" [80, p.29]. How did this decline of the humanistic tradition, for which the only reference point was the methodology borrowed from the natural sciences?

Gadamer answers through the fatal aestheticization of the basic concepts of humanism, first of all judgment and taste, which previously performed a cognitive

function. It was an act or consequence (of Gadamer hesitating in attribution) of Kant's "Critique of Judgment," which is subjective, aestheticized, and, similarly, deprives it of cognitive value. What does not meet the standards of objective and methodological methods of natural sciences is now considered simply "subjective" or "aesthetic", namely separated from the field of knowledge. Since Kantian subjectivization of the concept of taste, according to Gadamer, discredited any theoretical knowledge other than the natural sciences, it pushed the self-determination of the humanities to the methodology of natural science. This left a humanistic tradition in which the humanities could recognize themselves and embark on a path of aesthetic and subjective judgment.

What the sciences of the spirit [Geisteswissenschaften] have lost: "The significance of this position is difficult to overestimate. What has become quite clear is what philological and historical research lived on and due to which "the humanities", as they are called, wanted to methodically assert themselves along with the natural sciences "[80, p. 46]. This process also cannot be underestimated for the compositional structure of "Truth and Method". Only here should be considered art or aesthetics when considering this work. However, in revealing the subjectivation and aestheticization of the cornerstones of the humanistic tradition, the central question of self-reflection in the humanities is overlooked, and Gadamer supports this central question when he comprehends the process of creating a whole new aesthetic consciousness. Accordingly, the core of the introductory part of "Truth and Method" consists of a "critique of the abstraction of aesthetic consciousness."

We can say that the first part of this book has an anti-aesthetic rather than aesthetic content. Critique of Kant's theory of taste also contains the understanding that relativism in aesthetics is used as a means of describing the type of knowledge achieved in the humanities.

Restoration of the hermeneutic specificity of the humanities takes place in the second section of "Truth and Method", which contains Gadamer's "humanistic hermeneutics", as he systematically calls it [80, p. 264, 286, 314, 316, 330, 464]. Gadamer emphasizes the performance of the time interval for historical and hermeneutic understanding. This is exactly what is happening in the assessment of modern art.

Gadamer's further requirements for understanding the facts in the humanities must be met by developing an understanding as a consequence of the historical consideration of literary works, the history of their origin and interpretation. Obviously, texts in certain epochs evoke different interpretations, which is why it is so important to adhere to the principle of awareness of one's hermeneutic situation and the productivity of the time interval. However, Gadamer's historical consciousness means something much more fundamental, namely the history of influences (Wirkungsgeschichte), which has the status of a principle from which all his hermeneutics can be deduced [80, p. 305].

This understanding of our own historical effect occurs in Gadamer's assessment of historicism. He hoped to avoid historical conditioning by removing the history that defined him. According to historicism, a specially developed historical consciousness must be able to free itself from this state and thus allow the objective study of history. Gadamer, for his part, argues that the power of history does not depend on its recognition. Historical consciousness functions not only as a rational structure, but also on deeper levels. "Therefore," Gadamer concludes, "a person's prejudice is much greater than his judgment, outlining the historical reality of his existence" [80, p. 304].

Thus, the concept of effective historical consciousness has a rather subtle ambiguity. On the one hand, this means that our modern consciousness has been formed and really derived from real history. Our consciousness is literally provoked by history. On the other hand, it characterizes the consciousness of this

very activity, which can be repeated over and over again. This awareness of our activities can again mean two things: first, the need to clarify our historicity in the sense of elaborating our hermeneutic situation, but also, above all, the awareness of boundaries, such as education.

In this latter form, historical consciousness is the most unambiguous philosophical expression for realizing one's own extremity. Recognition of human limitations does not paralyze reflection, but vice versa. According to Gadamer, the historical orientation of understanding to the metaphysical ideal of knowledge was rather an obstacle. On the contrary, it is historical awareness promises to strengthen reflection. Proof of the universal and specific hermeneutic nature of our combined experience can be applied to Gadamer's finite hermeneutics.

After establishing the history of influence as a principle, Gadamer considers the "basic hermeneutic phenomenon", which came from the methodological research of the XIX century. The most important issue and the main difference with the former hermeneutics is the problem of application. In essence, Heidegger's hermeneutics saw the main role of hermeneutic understanding in its use .

In fact, the purpose of understanding was considered purely epistemological. There was a vague meaning to be understood. At best, the application of what is understood in this way has taken place retrospectively in disciplines such as specific jurisprudence, in the application of law to individual cases, or in theology, such as homiletic explanations of the text of the Bible.

However, according to Gadamer, the application of understanding has no retroactive effect. He follows Heidegger's intuition that understanding always includes cognition and even self-knowledge. At first, there was no pure, objective understanding of meaning, which later became especially important in relation to our questions. We enter each understanding procedure in such a way that the understanding and application coincide. This can be well illustrated by a negative example of misunderstanding: if we cannot understand a text, it is because it tells

us nothing. It is therefore not surprising or undesirable that understanding differs from era to era, and even from person to person.

The use of hermeneutics should not be done consciously, is not a conscious action. Self-sufficient subjectivity follows a tradition in which the past and present constantly communicate. Understanding the text from the past means translating it into our situation, finding a meaningful answer to the demands of our time. It was a departure from historicism to make objectivity dependent on the disappearance of the subject, because truth, understood here as meaning, is revealed only in the process of application in historical situations.

There is no interpretation and no understanding that does not answer certain questions that answer our urgency. An unmotivated question, such as that, will not affect anyone and therefore will not be of scientific interest. There is no need to try to exclude our expectations about the questions that raise the questions, but to emphasize them in such a way that the texts we are trying to understand can answer them more clearly. This is Gadamer's historical realization of the dialectic of question and answer.

From here we can see the transition to the third part of "Truth and Method", which is an ontological expansion of hermeneutics, which takes it beyond the humanities. Understanding is defined here as a relationship, or rather as a conversation. Thus, in terms of form, understanding is not so much the acquisition of meaning as the end of the conversation.

The question to ask is why language and conversation can be interchangeable. Who is the dialogic nature of language aimed at? This emphasis undoubtedly contradicts the rule of logic of expression in Western philosophy, with its traditional fixation of philosophical thinking on theoretical discourse, apodictic judgments that are theoretical in the sense that they are abstracted from everything that is not explicitly said.

This was a significant narrowing of the field of language, Gadamer, together with Heidegger, believe that the construction of the logic of utterances has become one of the most important decisions in Western culture. Countering this is the main motive of the hermeneutics of language, the simplest understanding of which may be as follows: "Language does not take place in utterances (Aussagen), but in speech (conversation - Gespräch)" [80, p. 359].

Contrary to the logic of the statement, for which the sentence forms a self-sufficient unit of meaning, hermeneutics reminds us that the statement never differs from its own motivational context (Motivationszusammenhang), ie from the conversation in which it is embedded and from which it only makes sense.

Understanding language is not reduced to the subject's intellectual perception of objective, isolated factual content, but depends on its belonging to the ongoing tradition, ie to the conversation, from which only what has been said acquires consistency and meaning for us.

There are no statements in this dialogue, but there are questions and answers, which in turn raise new questions. There is not just a statement that can be understood solely on the basis of the content it represents, if one wants to understand it in its truth. Each statement has preconditions which it does not establish. Only those who take these requirements into account can really measure the truth of the statement. Gadamer says: the last logical form of such motivation of each statement is a question. Here we touch on the heart of hermeneutic philosophy, namely, as Gadamer put it, "the hermeneutics of the primary state of affairs, which is that there is no possible statement that cannot be understood as an answer to a question, and that it can only be understood as such »[87, p. 226].

Gadamer says of the "inner word" (verbuminterius), of something unspoken but resonant that is mentioned in every linguistic expression. For Gadamer, it is a kind of soul of hermeneutics and in it the essence of his critique of the logic of statements. This doctrine of the inner word, consonant with both the semantic

theory of the Stoics and the theory of the inner form of language of W. von Humboldt, really very clearly shows that the words we use when they come to mind can not exhaust us. The inner word somewhere "behind" what is said means nothing more than this conversation, but the basis and essence of language in our interrogative and self-inquiring existence, a conversation that cannot fully convey the statement: "What is said is not everything. Only the unspoken turns what is said into a word that can reach us "[87, p. 504].

However, it should be noted that this is hermeneutics and theory of language, not some mystique of the unspeakable. To understand something, it is necessary to discuss the language itself, and not the unspoken, internal conversation. Gadamer notes: "Of course, the basic linguistic nature of understanding cannot mean that all world experience takes place only as speaking and talking" [87, p. 496].

If, however, the basic linguistic aspect of our language experience is asserted, it is only because language embodies the only means of internal communication that we are for ourselves and for each other. The limit of each statement is felt only in the light of what can be said. That is why hermeneutics allows a proposal such as "be clear". The basic language of understanding is expressed in our utterances to a lesser extent than in our search for language for what we have in our souls and want to express. For the hermeneutic side of understanding, it is less important that it is linguistic in nature, which would be banal, than that it lives from the endless process of "inclusion in the word" and the search for language and should be understood in the context of this process. Because it is this process, the corresponding realization of the inner word, that determines the universality of hermeneutics, the universality of the hermeneutic universe.

The assertion of universality is important for understanding that hermeneutics thematizes numerous discussions. Can this be understood as a claim to commonality in Gadamer's philosophy? In this case, how can it be reconciled with the hermeneutic thesis of the historicity of any understanding? Gadamer speaks

of the de facto "universality of linguistic understanding," "universal hermeneutics," which affects the general understanding of the world, and the spread of hermeneutics "to universal questions." There are such common names as "universality of the hermeneutic problem", as the title of the article of 1966 or "hermeneutic dimension" in "Truth and Method". It cannot be said that we clearly understand what Gadamer is talking about in this case, what he means by this universality. Gadamer is not very concerned with a careful explanation of terms that seem to pay homage to the tendency of the logic of utterances to break down language into meaningful units.

In the context of Gadamer's work, we are talking about the universal aspect of hermeneutics, which is defined as meaning. The universality of the hermeneutic question will mean for hermeneutics and philosophy itself that it does not belong to the side problems of the methodology of the humanities. The search for understanding and meaning is not just a methodological problem, but the main characteristic of human reality.

Thus, the "universal aspect" of hermeneutics can be contrasted with purely "humanitarian" hermeneutics. In this respect, hermeneutics is a universal aspect of philosophy, not just the methodological basis of the so-called humanities. All of Gadamer's philosophical, speculative efforts tend to expand the horizons of hermeneutics beyond human limitations in such a way that it also becomes the main task of philosophy.

This means the extension of hermeneutics to the universal questions of philosophy and the "ontological turn of hermeneutics" .

But how can we talk about the universality of the hermeneutic dimension or experience, without sacrificing a philosophy that considers it absolute? The word "universality" here is easily misleading. In the context of "Truth and Method", the universality of language opposes the thesis of limitation, which is probably represented by specific languages. Gadamer replies that this is not the case,

because language is characterized by the fact that it can look for expression for everything. This is meant when talking about the universality of language, which goes hand in hand with the infinity of the mind.

This dimension of language is universal and forms a universe in which all understanding and human existence take place. Of course, this does not mean that language has an expression for everything that exists. True language never exhausts what needs to be said. Its versatility lies in finding the right expression. Thus, the universal dimension that keeps hermeneutics in suspense is an inner word, a conversation in which each expression receives its life. Hermeneutically significant in language is the dimension of internal conversation, the fact that our utterance always means more than it really says. We are not given final knowledge of a language or concept. We live in a conversation that can never end, because no words can be who we are and how we understand our existence.

The universality of hermeneutic philosophizing is rooted in the inner word, in which there is a desire for understanding and language, which constitutes the universe of our finiteness. Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy carries out a self-interpretation of human reality, which tries to explain its extremity as a universal horizon from which everything can make sense to us.

If there is something universal in philosophical hermeneutics, then it is probably the recognition of one's own ending, the realization that our real language is not enough for an inner conversation that forces us to understand and make sense.

Gadamer's philosophy is probably the most recent, original and closed concept of hermeneutics and has been recognized as one of the most decisive contributions to philosophy since Heidegger's time. The latter has moved somewhat away from the philosophical debate of the mid-1930s, although its influence has always remained significant. Gadamer again brought hermeneutics to a philosophical discussion that became more and more intense.

One should ask whether a different understanding of the role of hermeneutic discourse and its ontological content is possible? Gadamer's hermeneutics expresses this tendency as fully as possible, but the numerous metaphors of universality he uses do not suggest that the situation is fully clarified. Yet hermeneutics claims the role of scientific discourse in terms of meaning, truth, understanding and interpretation.

Despite the impressive achievements and efforts, the process of finding hermeneutics its place among the humanities can be considered complete. Gadamer's efforts can be justified only if further ontological and historical elaboration of controversial points. For example, his work did not reflect the many types of semantic activities that are associated with various ontologically indeterminate forms of discourse: fantasies, illusions, fictions, dreams, and so on. Countless contexts in which a person shows doubts, insecurities, mistakes - are also the object of hermeneutic discourse.

In the teachings of G.-G. Gadamer, the claim of hermeneutic philosophy to universality reaches its highest point, which, in fact, turns hermeneutics into a new form, a kind of ontology. However, this was done using the tools of classical metaphysics and therefore remained at the level of an impressive project. As this experience shows, the renewal of philosophical hermeneutics and its problem field is impossible without a radical change of perspective on philosophy itself and its tasks.

3.3. Apel´s philosophy in the context of hermeneutic experience

The general thesis about the conformity of philosophical hermeneutics to the stages of development of Western European metaphysics is confirmed by considering some modern versions of metaphysics, more precisely, abbreviated forms or receptions of metaphysics.

In this section we will consider the features of the "linguistic paradigm" of K. Apel, who subjected to critical reconstruction of the philosophical tradition in German philosophy of language and hermeneutics. Of particular relevance is the appeal to the idea of the unity of language and language conditions of the possibility of intersubjectivity of the pragmatics of understanding oneself and others.

Here we should turn to the original understanding of metaphysics, which, although underwent a number of transformations in its development, but retained the most important semantic core, which we find in Aristotle, and in its implicit form in Plato and Parmenides.

As you know, the very term τὰμετὰτὰφυσικά speaks of something either post-physical or something beyond physical consideration. So μετὰ-means in the middle, together; after, then. According to this value, this prefix is still used. We can mention metalanguage (Tarsky), metatheories (theory about theory); also "above" in the sense of "more", "includes" - metagalaxy.

Related to this are general approaches to the definition of metaphysics and its relationship to philosophy. In many theories, metaphysics is perceived as philosophy itself. In others, metaphysics is a section and a certain aspect of philosophy and philosophizing. If the section, then not in the same sense in which we talk, for example, about ethics, aesthetics, etc. Metaphysics is a conversation about the world on a new level (higher); it is "more" than physics, it deals with what is not created, what is not born - essence. In its most important aspect, metaphysics is first and foremost metaphilosophy.

Any metaphysics, by any definition, is a philosophy, but not every philosophy is metaphysical. Metaphysics is the center of philosophy, its mediastinum, semantic core, the basis. You can also use the image of the root, trunk and crown. But the illustrations leave out all the complexity of the relationship between metaphysics and philosophy in general. Here we can mention Thompson Clark and his example, which illustrates the difference between questions of common sense, science, on the one hand, and philosophical questions, on the other [88].

Continuing this analogy, we can add a third type of question or even the question itself - metaphysical, rooted somewhere in the depths of philosophical questions. Most people do not feel the difference between everyday questions or scientific and philosophical, most people who call themselves "philosophers" do not feel the difference between metaphysical and non-metaphysical philosophical questions. For example, one may wonder why Diogenes the Cynic did not understand Plato and brought him all sorts of birds? Because he was a philosopher, but not a metaphysician. It is also worth mentioning Plotinus, who answered the question "What is philosophy?", "The most important" (το τιμιοτατον - the most valuable, most important, most expensive, etc.).

From the point of view of the modern researcher of the history of metaphysics M. Loux (Michael Loux), metaphysics explores the essence of what is, which is completely consistent with the position of Aristotle. [89]. Thus, the metaphysical meaning is "packaged", "sewn" into any other issues, including metaphysical. Theoretically, there is no question that could not be imagined as metaphysical. This often seems absurd, where this level is excessive (for example, the "metaphysics of football").

Equally important for our study is the question of how metaphysics becomes hermeneutics? How and why the famous "turn to language" is carried out.

At an early stage of its formation, metaphysics deals with being as such. Subsequently, it goes through a number of historical and semantic stages of

development. There are three main periods on this path, metaphysics, read as an ontology, then, in modern times, the transition to the interpretation of subjectivity, finally, in the twentieth century, the formation and development of metaphysical discourse about language.

Thus, the same philosophical problem can be considered in the horizon of being (ontological horizon), the horizon of subjectivity (subject; phenomenological horizon), the horizon of language (meaning). However, the unity of truth can be traced at all these stages. All of them are elements of a certain whole of metaphysics. What is this whole? And more importantly, is it possible to open a new space for research? Maybe then - only theology, which follows neither logically nor phenomenally. In other words, the existence of God is given differently than the intentionality or cognitive capabilities of man. It is after the new development of metaphysics that it becomes a hermeneutic discourse.

Despite the fundamental "non-physicality" of metaphysics, it should be noted the importance of empiricism for the formation of metaphysical discourse. What else does metaphysics do but look for stable, essential regularities, ideal components of our experience, that is, empiricism. But isn't this the task of science in general or of philosophy as a whole?

The name of Karl-Otto Apel (1922–2017) is associated with the last generation of representatives of the German philosophical classics, ie this philosopher is one of the last metaphysicians in modern German philosophy. Appeal - the author's original concept of "transcendental pragmatics", which proposed to perceive modern philosophy through the prism of the paradigm of "first philosophy", known since the time of Aristotle [90; 91]. Stable scheme of reasoning that we live in an era of post-metaphysical thinking, the German philosopher contrasts his own paradigm that the idea of "first philosophy" itself must be thematically understood in a number of historical paradigm shifts. The "first philosophy" should not be taken as some abstract knowledge of the "limited" wholeness of

being, outwardly objectified. "First Philosophy" is able today to reproduce the cognitive reflection on the pragmatic conditions of language and the universal significance of philosophical thinking, which is achieved in the intersubjective pragmatics of understanding oneself and others.

Aristotle's idea of protophilosophy presupposes, first of all, an ontology, which later, as is well known, began to be perceived as metaphysics. Historical and hermeneutic reconstruction of the history of philosophy, carried out by a German philosopher, allows a fruitful understanding of the inevitable and indisputable significance of the metaphysical point of view. Apel points to two possibilities in combining the dimensions of the mind in the tradition, which is accepted as a philosophical logos. The first possible "return" he sees in the ways of the ancient ontological paradigm of protophilosophy, and as the final idea of ontotheology, it occurs in Descartes as the basis of the ultimate rationale for philosophy. At the same time, Appel's critique is aimed at methodical solipsism in the Cartesian style of thinking, because he had to refute the initial preconditions of philosophy itself by criticizing meaning. The second paradigm of the "first philosophy" corresponds to Kant's critical philosophy, which in Hegel finds its radical embodiment in Kant's critique in the fundamental identification of his philosophy with the history of dogmatic metaphysics.

But the second paradigm, according to the German philosopher, opens a new dimension in philosophy - the space of transcendental reflection and thus sets and determines the possibility of the third paradigm of modern philosophy, a kind of the latest transformation of transcendental philosophy. Already Kant seeks to substantiate the objective significance of cognition through the possible experience of transcendental reflection. However, he, according to Apel, continues to remain faithful to the inherited scheme of understanding, based on the "divine point of view", which recognizes the ontological and metaphysical theory of "two worlds". Kant manages to formulate philosophical questions that clarify the general conditions of the possibilities of science, mathematics and

physics. However, many questions still remain unanswered, this applies to the specifics of communicative and linguistic a priori subject-object relations, the peculiarities of the interpretation of practical philosophy of the subject in all its forms.

In this sense, it is no accident that Kant finds Solomon's solution when he proposes to distinguish between empirical studies, which already in the XVIII century. generated a powerful growth of individual sciences, while maintaining the traditional unity of philosophy and science. Kant points out that any philosophy is either knowledge from pure reason or knowledge of reason from empirical principles. The first is called pure, and the second empirical philosophy. Moreover, transcendental philosophy is defined as the idea of science, and the real task is rational analysis and study of the possibility of a priori concepts, the primary philosophical foundations of science. Transcendental philosophy must include a fundamental analysis of all a priori human knowledge.

Apel synthesizes three paradigms because he believes that he was once creatively prepared by the philosophy of language - the ideas of I.-G. Haman, I. Herder and W. von Humboldt. As a result, language and communication are perceived by the basic dimensions of the philosophical Logos in the XX century: in the phenomenology of M. Heidegger and the hermeneutics of G.-G. Gadamer, the analytical philosophy of G. Frege, B. Russell and L. Wittgenstein. It is due to the third paradigm, which allows you to specify the concept of critique of reason in the sense of the concept of critique of language, it becomes possible to implement a "pragmatic turn" in modern philosophy.

It is important to note that the idea of transformation of transcendental philosophy Kant Apel for the first time reproduces as a key in the philosophical program of modification of modern philosophy in general. In the work "Transformation of Philosophy" (1973) [90] he develops his own arsenal of pragmatic arguments of transcendentalism. Apel combines in synthesis the scattered lines of

argumentation of existing philosophical directions, which allows him to determine the legitimate place of ontology in the system of philosophical cognition and in the perspective of transcendental philosophy of language and in intersubjectivity to see the possibility not only of synthesis and reflection but also practical philosophy.

To understand why transcendental pragmatics has become a symbol of the synthetic paradigm in the philosophical discourse of the era, which avoids radical critique of reason and critique of culture, it must first be borne in mind that the metaphysical significance of philosophical knowledge Apel offers to interpret in line with language analytics. The philosophical Logos is understood by them in two ways, in a dialectical manner: both as reason and as language. The critique of cognition is transformed into a critique of language and a critique created in language through the use of signs, meaning. He replaces the whole former transcendental attitude, which proceeds from Kant's idea of a priori cognition, with the indirect nature of the pragmatic use of language as a cognitive element in modern society. The German philosopher perceives the return to the origins of transcendental philosophy as a way to return to the transcendental component of modern philosophy.

Appel's metaphysicality, in his view, is that he defines the ideal community as a transcendental subject, which considers a priori the real possibility of an expanded search for argumentation, mutual understanding and reflection on the meaning of any statement aimed at reaching consensus as a goal. The possibility of any knowledge is identified in this case with the possibility of any argument. The possibility of reflection always provides the possibility of argumentation.

A clear and distinct demarcation of the empirical and transcendental philosophical position, according to Appel, can be achieved only through discussion and dialogue, open to reasonable arguments. The arsenal of arguments that give rise

to rational discourse, in the end, is possible almost only by distinguishing between real and ideal communicative community.

Rational argumentation, which becomes necessary in the presentation of any problem, implies the importance of universal ethical norms. The question of ethics as a prerequisite for logic for Apel is a strategic question, because it concerns the ethical foundations of any rational argument.

Apel attributes a special role to the critique of modern approaches to language, pointing out, in particular, that the metaphors familiar to the philosopher no longer achieve their goal when it comes to rational theory of language. Philosophy, in his opinion, just like the theory of knowledge, cannot give the private sciences an objective thematization of language. Philosophy today faces the problem of language as the problem of the foundations of scientific and theoretical construction of concepts and statements, as well as their own positions, that is, the problem of meaningful and intersubjectively significant formulation of knowledge in general.

Apel believes that the "first philosophy" is no longer a study of the nature and essence of things or being, that is, an ontology, it is no longer a reflection on ideas or concepts of consciousness or reason - a theory of knowledge, but a reflection on the meaning or content of linguistic expressions, language analysis. This is joined by the fact that not only the first philosophy in the sense of theoretical philosophy, but also practical philosophy - for example, ethics in the sense of meta-ethics - must now be methodically mediated by philosophical analysis of word usage and, consequently, philosophy of language [90, p. 239].

This approach, self-explanatory, still raises a number of questions. First, the linguistic orientation of modern philosophy is not a narrowing of the ontological field of metaphysics. We do not reduce the theoretical weight of philosophical ontology to the level of linguistic empiricism, on the contrary, we bring the understanding of language to the ontological level. This is exactly what Heidegger

does when he speaks of language as the house of being. The only thing that could be objected to is the excessive hypostasis of language and its transformation into an independent quantity, a substance.

Secondly, it is impossible to agree with Appel's thesis about the exhaustion of the discourse of the "first philosophy", about the dominance of language and the rejection of classical ontological models. The former home ontology has not ceased to exist at all and has not exhausted its potential, it is enough to mention Heidegger or A. Badiou's philosophy again. We see in this turn to language not a decrease in the significance of the classical ontology, not a rejection of its problems, but a new stage of development, an essential addition and expansion of its semantic horizon.

Apel proposes to concretize the understanding of oneself and others in the spirit of transcendental language play, or communication, which first presupposes the intersubjective significance of moral norms. Understanding oneself and others means understanding the conditions for understanding the meaning of moral norms, and these processes are fundamentally public. The basic norm of mutual recognition of discussion partners implicitly includes the condition of recognition of all people as individuals. The ethics of logical reasoning, like the ethics of discourse, involves the recognition of the individual as the subject of an act of communication, understanding, and language. This moral requirement for all members of the community is the basis of ethics of dialogue, ethics of interpersonal dialogue, ethics of any discourse. The ideal basis of ethics is a priori the communicative community of individuals as morally competent subjects. This is the recognition of the basic moral norm: ethical community is understood in the spirit of Kant's fact of reason, opening space for justification of the basic ethical principle.

Every person, writes Apel, every moment of his life must willingly reinforce their participation in the transcendental communicative community as a morally

competent person. Thus, the basic moral norm can be understood as the principle of transsubjectivity, considering it as the basic principle of democratic ethics of solidarity or method of moral discussion and any practical discussion. The institutionalization of moral debate in society requires from members of an unlimited society not only the recognition of the real equality of partnership in communication, but also personal moral responsibility for all major and minor consequences. Even in the absence of communication, when the individual is in conditions close to the border situation, and he is required to make absolutely unique decisions, when he is forced to seemingly violate all moral norms, he can still deliberately act in his person to represent all mankind, and choosing himself, to recognize the right to be a man, to be a citizen of the world, as well as of all mankind - in the spirit of Appeal - cosmopolitan community.

Apel believes that the existence of an ideal ethical community in reality leaves and preserves the meaning of the survival of the human race and its self-affirmation and liberation. Apel calls this meaning a strategy of liberation in the age of science and technology. In specific historical situations, bordering on risk and commitment, the right strategy is moral determination, which in the pursuit of self-understanding is based on the principle of moral self-transcendence.

The concept of "transcendental" in such a pragmatic context Apel defines as a special type of philosophical thinking, which in various respects is always thematically and methodologically sound, so reasoned discourse is critical of all rationally justified and in this status is regarded as the basis of all possible conditions.

We must recognize that in this perspective, transcendental philosophy is not only the idea of the possible feasibility of all necessary conceivable normative conditions, but also a targeted strategy of argumentation, which implies the possibility of rational substantiation of substantive claims of all judgments and actions. According to Apel's transcendental pragmatics, only in this way is it

possible today to achieve a rational solution to all controversial issues in the philosophical, scientific and cultural community.

How justified is this understanding of metaphysics and such a vision of the hermeneutic subject? Adding a collective dimension to hermeneutics, the search for a collective social interpreter, and finally, the search for an ethical component of interpretation - this is what Apel is talking about and this, of course, is a certain innovation in the development of philosophical hermeneutics. But what do we really get as a result of such innovations? Did not the hermeneutics of F. Schleiermacher or F. Ast have a moral dimension, was it completely adiaphoric? And did not the hermeneutic position of V. Dilthey contain ideas about the socio-cultural and, thus, the collective aspect of understanding and interpretation? Apel draws attention to these issues, as the creator of communicative philosophy, but still it is seen as a tribute to our communicative era and the man of our time.

The traumatic experience of the twentieth century, especially relevant to postwar German philosophy, required understanding in the field of collective, social phenomena, establishing a clear divide between the subject's ability to make independent decisions, freely interpreting reality, or submit to collective choice, which also creates the illusion of understanding and deprives the individual of even the illusion of freedom.

Undoubtedly, the attempt of the German philosopher to reveal the unity of such different philosophical teachings, for example, to unite the philosophy of M. Heidegger and the semiotics of Ch.S. Pierce, however, even recognizing the value of such different approaches, it should be understood that these authors proceeded from completely different methodological settings, had before them fundamentally different ontological models of reality. Any possible closeness between such different philosophers is only a reflection of the most general anthropological characteristics, such as understanding the important role of language in the organization of human communities and for the existence of man

himself. But at the same time, the distance between Heidegger's man and Pierce's man seems so great that we could compare humans and aliens with the same success.

In summary, it should be noted that collective hermeneutics, collective understanding and interpretation are impossible, all these are abstractions that describe some group phenomena and it is a subject of actively developing social psychology. But this discipline is an empirical science and has no metaphysical dimension of its own. Hermeneutic discourse in the framework of communication theory and social psychology is, of course, possible, but only as a local aspect of the social subject's activity. In other words, Appel's philosophy serves as a supplement to metaphysics, a kind of ersatz of metaphysical discourse, which does not provide a philosophical hermeneutics proper ontological basis.

3 CONNECTION OF HERMENEUTICS WITH ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY

3.1. Key issues in analitical philosophy

A fundamentally important factor accompanying the formation and development of philosophical hermeneutics in Germany at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries and further, up to the present time, there has been controversy with representatives of a fundamentally different tradition in the understanding of language, interpretation and related problems. Traditionally, this trend is referred to as analytical philosophy, which is positioned as a more or less radical critique of European metaphysics and, accordingly, philosophical hermeneutics, as its legitimate product.

The key problems of analytical philosophy are the definition of meaning and significance as such, as well as in situations of pragmatic use of language. The only difference between them and philosophical hermeneutics is that the hermeneutics pays more attention to interpretations of spiritual culture, while analytical philosophy at an early stage was engaged in the study of the language of scientific discourse, and at a later stage - the language of everyday life. But the discourse of everyday life is the basis of any discourse in general and also requires hermeneutic analysis.

No less important topic for analysts is the presence and principles of interpretation of mental characteristics of man and the importance of its reflection in everyday language. It is the characteristics of consciousness that are the point where the scientific interests of both representatives of the analytical tradition and hermeneutic studies intersect. The fact that analysts always appear more restrained in their assessments and more skeptical in their interpretations should not prevent us from considering a certain closeness or even congeniality of some analysts and classics of philosophical hermeneutics.

Beginning with the work of G. Frege, analytical philosophy did not leave the space of German-speaking intellectual culture for a long time, so until the mid-30s much of the success of this tradition was associated with German and Austrian culture. In addition to Frege, it is enough to mention the representatives of the Viennese circle, the Berlin school and, of course, L. Wittgenstein, who remained a German-speaking philosopher until the end of his life, at least judging by his texts. With the exception of correspondence and lecture notes, all other texts by L. Wittgenstein are written in german language.

Modern historical and philosophical literature has long discussed the question of the conformity of analytical philosophy, especially the philosophy of mature Wittgenstein, in the period when he began to analyze natural language and the problems of phenomenology and grew out of philosophical hermeneutics [92].

The very formulation of problems, as well as Wittgenstein's inherent careful study of all semantic aspects of any question or difficulty facing him, makes his style and the very nature of the presentation of the material very close to the hermeneutic discourse. In other words, despite his constantly declared skepticism about mentalism, metaphysics, and its overly meaningful concepts, Wittgenstein did in fact show the fundamental complexity of language and its formations, the ambiguity of interpretations, and the importance of the same linguistic fictions [93].

Wittgenstein constantly talks about the correspondence of logic, language and the world, assuming that the world has some logical properties: "The so-called logical propositions show the logical properties of language and consequently the world, but they say nothing. Each proposal shows something - along with what it says - about the world: because if it had no meaning, it could not be used, and if it makes sense, it reflects the logical property of the world "[94, p. 209].

First, it is characteristic that Wittgenstein unambiguously connects the logical properties of the world and language. Secondly, we are talking about the

meaninglessness of the most logical forms, which "suits" any meaning that is thought. After all, you can calculate centaurs, mermaids, and from this logic will not cease to be logic. More precisely, it only seems to us that logic is concerned with the calculation of something, whereas at first it is completely indifferent to any possible content and any distinction within this mental conglomerate.

We can adapt logical calculations to solve specific problems, but this use of logic says nothing about its essence, just as a student can count apples or cats, but it will not tell him anything about the essence of the number. In other words, the ability to use a system does not always mean understanding the meaning of what is happening. There is a temptation to introduce a mental (ideational) component in any situation of operating with signs. But we can easily imagine the use of signs without appealing to the mental state of the user.

Yes, it is possible that in some enclosed space there is a device that monitors the content of harmful substances in the air. If a certain level is exceeded, this device sends a signal to the center, which gives the command to turn on, for example, ventilation. There is a system that uses signs with an obvious pragmatic effect, but clearly does not have its own mentality, and the very question of "understanding" or "meaning" of what is happening can not even be asked. The usual objection in such cases is that such a system could appear only in the presence of the mental states of its creator, the developer, who really understood what and why he was doing and which sign system was better to choose for this technical system. Why does it seem that such an objection does not capture the essence of the issue? That regardless of the thoughts and feelings of the author, the system works independently using signs, and will work, even if all who understand the essence of the whole process disappear. The hieroglyphs of ancient culture before they were deciphered, the personal code of a long-dead person - is not a meaningful (ie mental) system of notation, although there is no one who could read them. Isn't that why various phenomena of nature seem to us reasonable or reasonably arranged: cosmological regularities, development of life,

behavior of animals and in general - the whole organization of the world process. Does not mean the isomorphism of the world-thinking-language, that all this has one common mental source. The eternal theme and "argumentation" of idealism.

This isomorphism can be represented in different ways. For example, the epistemological majority speaks of the instrumental nature of language and that its procedures (meaning, reference, indication) are secondary to what is denoted, ie are procedures, a way of working with some objects or simply the relationship between the latter.

Heidegger, for example, takes a different view: "To study the phenomena of indication, sign, and especially meaning as their characteristics, as an attitude, no one has heard anything. Finally, it should even be shown that the "attitude" due to its formal and general nature has an ontological source in the instructions "[95, p. 77]. In other words, the sign and the instruction itself are primary than the function they perform, and even more primary than the self-designation itself, because the latter appears due to the instructions.

Judging by later comments, Heidegger believes that this is the verdict on logistics (this is the analytical philosophy of that period - Frege, Russell, the Viennese circle, etc.). In the case of "formalization" in logistics, everything agrees well, because it basically says nothing, at least from Heidegger's point of view. That is, the eternal reproach to logic and analysts is that they are meaningless, that do not penetrate into the essence of things, only because they have everything clear and everything goes well. Badiou, for example, considers them sophists, who hide behind scientific descriptions of their true ignorance and misunderstanding. The opposite reproach: Heidegger and his ilk are just writers who can write well about anything. Their words mean nothing and are a form of sound imitation or similar to the singing of birds and the chirping of insects.

Strictly speaking, no one has set and does not set the rules of the game at all. All this is conditional, and if so, then the rules can be changed. In addition, it may

turn out that Heidegger and others are simply playing philosophy incorrectly, just as chess can be played incorrectly. And are Heidegger's texts always really adequate? It is possible that the real complexity of life, all our texts have not yet grown up, and what is really available to us, can be stated more clearly.

But this is, of course, relativism. Moreover, relativism is linguistic, transformed into ontological and existential. And being is not the same for a German, a Frenchman and a Chinese, and love, fear and death are not the same for them, but the fact that all people somehow love, somehow afraid of death, but we somehow understand each other, for example, we somehow translate the same Heidegger. But this is exactly what is not needed in terms of this "somehow" to criticize someone else's way of thinking. In other words, everyone is right in their own way.

The attitude of our statements to reality has many aspects: "And you can not say that a madman is talking nonsense, claiming that he is Napoleon. Rather, we can say that he is simply wrong "[96, p. 128].

In relation to Christ, such reasoning sounds absurd, that is, it does not grasp the essence of the question. But we can say that in the case of a mentally ill person claiming that he is Napoleon, we also do not grasp the essence of the issue. Do we not come up with similar questions to the fact that any combination of signs, any language activity makes sense, that is, has an essence.

What does "logically possible" or "logically impossible" mean in general? Can this be clearly explained? Does logic establish the possibility or impossibility of the existence of something? Shouldn't we think that everything that comes to our mind is logically possible? In fact, what does logic have to do with how many hands I have or whether there are rhinos in this room. In other words, the problem of reliability is not a problem of logic, but rather of epistemology and psychology. If the sentence makes sense, ie it speaks about some object (better - about some recognizable situation, known situation), then it can be used. The very fact of

using the sentence is, if not evidence of its truth, then, in any case, is a direct pragmatic effect. And what about the proposals of logic? How can contradictions be used? Does the fact that I can't use it mean that it doesn't make sense? Or the fact that I can't use it in the same way as a regular sentence doesn't mean that these sentences are just from different calculations. We may not use any logic and its propositions. If the moment of authenticity, equality with oneself, is present in one way or another in any of our actions or reasoning, then can it be called the use of logic?

For comparison, for example, Losev: "Now they understand that we can say -and no relation to reality. 'Round square'. Did I say anything? I said. Did you understand? Of course I understood. Is this true? No. I do not know. 'Volodya, I have wooden iron here!' Here, in what I have said, everything is there - except for the objective fact of wooden iron. I did not observe such a fact "[97, p. 522].

Also in Ayer: "Empirics face real difficulties in connection with the truths of formal logic and mathematics" [98, p. 72]. Defending his empiricism, Ayer shows that the truths of mathematics and logic are analytical, and therefore do not contain information about reality, therefore, their a priori does not mean that we have a priori knowledge of the world [98, p. 86-87]. This can also be understood in the sense that logic and mathematics say nothing about the existence or non-existence of any objects. Then it is unclear why all analysts insist on the inadmissibility of the logical possibility of the existence of fictional objects?

Perhaps, "... any sign is inherently autosemantic and ontological, that is, it is something that exists and presents itself in this guise. Any thing, any property or relation can be signs, but only if we relate them to something other than ourselves. Can the property of "being a sign" be attributed to things in themselves? No more than acknowledging the thing itself. However, there are special things that we know for sure that they are signs, signs by definition, as well as any of their systems. Perhaps the sign is the only thing that, being in itself completely

coincides with its phenomenal form. Isn't that why we are able to see the connection of a sign with anything, that the sign represents itself, the function of being a present is inherent in it a priori, first and foremost. Signs mean and signify even at the end of the world, because they define it. The real end would be the cessation of signs, the cessation of sign as such "[99, p. 243].

The existence of consciousness, or, in fact, any existence, consists, among other things, in the action of naming and combining names and meanings. Any possible assessment of the latter, be it radically nihilistic, theological or scientist, inevitably remains within the relationship of naming and signification. The ontological aspect of a sign is that it is a sign and is nothing else.

Some authors who have done much for the formation of philosophical hermeneutics (W. von Humboldt, G. Shpet) add to the semantic word a supra-semantic level - the internal form of the word. Is the latter a semantic category (semantic concept) or is it some kind of fantasy about language and its structures? Most likely, the internal form of the word is a metaphysical category, something non-existent, redundancy that is guessed in the word and language.

The interpretation of the latter has several levels related to the above levels of significance. All this can be figuratively represented as a wandering of the logical form within the word and language at all stages of self-determination of the latter. Paradoxically, Shpet's internal logical form in terms of localization coincides with the most external forms of the word: acoustic and graphic, which are also "splashed" at all levels of significance.

The most profound, archetypal and, in fact, unreliable, noumenal, is in the same connection with the actual functioning of the sign, as the most obvious, most authentic forms. Finally, somewhere in the conditional interval between them are the actual grammatical forms: phonetic, morphological, semantic, syntactic, as well as historical and cultural forms, which are, in fact, only a variation of language. Both considered classifications, despite the differences, move from the

revealed to the intelligible, from the external objectivity to the internal, from the obvious to the hidden.

Heidegger expresses the view that the sign, in addition to being a tool, is also an indicator of the very possibility of being to be at the hand of man: showing, expression, manifestation, narration] as a possible concretization of what-suitability is funded in the structure of presence in general, in its back-to [Um-zu] . Symbolic indication belongs as a feature of the tool [Zeugcharakter – property of the tool or tool characteristic] applied to the integrity of the tool, to the relationship of links. 3) The sign is not only a tool next to other means, but in its instrumentality every time something accessible to the judgment of the surrounding world is made. The sign is something ontic-instrumental, which is a certain means to show the ontological structure of the instrumentality, integrity and belonging of Dasein to the world "[95, p. 82].

Note also in Wittgenstein: "Imagine the people who use in circulation, namely coins that look like our gold or silver coins and they also give them for goods - but everyone gives for goods how much he wants and the seller does not give the customer more or less goods, depending on how he pays; in short, this money, or what it looks like, plays a completely different role than ours. We would feel much less close to these people than to those who do not yet know any money and use a primitive kind of barter. - "But the coins of these people will have, after all, some purpose [meaning]!" –Does everything that is done [by people] matter? For example, religious actions. It is possible that they would tend to call people who behave in this way crazy. However, we do not call crazy those who act in a similar way in the forms of our culture, for example, use words 'aimlessly'. (Consider the coronation of the king!) "[100, p. 95].

How legitimate is the comparison in this context: financial calculations, religious actions and state rituals? In all three cases we are dealing with certain symbolic forms, but the differences between them are quite obvious. In the case of money,

there is a specific measure of value by which everything that can be a commodity is valued. In the case of religion and power, we do not have a clear line between them, as in the first case. Here everywhere - either tradition or arbitrariness.

Among other things, it is unclear what, in fact, the need is met in each case and, moreover, what benefits the individual receives by participating in such actions. So, the example of money is more like a demonstration of madness than other examples of Wittgenstein, although for many - religious actions, not to mention religious feelings, are a sign of abnormality or, at least, arouse suspicion. The same can be said about the fascination with state rituals.

Of course, it is also true that everything that people do makes sense. Everything in which you can see the system or at least its likeness. Or maybe without any system. In cases where the system is not yet seen, but I will not declare the actions meaningless. Why should we think that the people in Wittgenstein's first example are crazy? Just because we can't explain their calculation system? But maybe it's just a game or even a joke to mislead us, or maybe these people pay each other like little children who either do not know the real value of goods, or in this social system it does not matter. In general, the discovery of meaning in human actions is a matter of personal attitude rather than the actual presence of meaning. In any case, we are ready to find or at least assume a rational grain in any human action, even in the approach that nothing that is done by man makes sense.

Wittgenstein constantly emphasizes the connection of his position with some objective, real truth or with reality as such: "Our task is not to search for calculations, but to describe the real [gegenwärtigen] state of affairs. The idea of a predicate that refers to itself, etc., is based, of course, on examples - but these examples were nonsense, they were not invented. But this does not mean that such predicates could not be used, and that then the contradiction would not have its application! Is it still impossible for us to want to make contradictions? That we, proud of this mathematical discovery, say, 'Look how we produce contradictions.'

Is it possible, for example, that many people try to create contradictions in the field of logic, and that this is finally someone succeeded? But why should people try to do that? Now, perhaps, I can't point to any clear goal. And why, for example, not to show that everything in this world is uncertain? These people would never really use the expressions of the form 'f (f)', however, they would be happy to live next door [Nachbarschaft] with contradiction "[100, p. 210-211].

It is difficult to say that such a life next to a contradiction is most likely just a metaphor. The desire to generate contradiction certainly exists and it can have any metaphysical preconditions. But can we "generate" contradictions, rather, only to identify, express, record. The use of contradictions in logic is possible as a technical procedure or the use of contradictions as an example in some language game, as Wittgenstein does, finally contradictory logical paradoxes and then we are dealing with a special field of logical research. In that case, what is the application of contradiction? It all depends on the point of view, according to one - everything that can be expressed and thought can be applied one way or another. According to the other, before talking about the possibility of applying the contradiction, you should think about the actual applicability of consistent statements.

"Why should there be no contradiction in mathematics?" -And why can't it be in our simple language games? (There is clearly a connection here.) Is this the basic law that governs all conceivable language games? The contradiction in the order, for example, causes surprise and indecision, and now we say: this is precisely the purpose of the contradiction in this language game "[100, p. 254-255].

All attempts to distinguish between meaning and significance, starting with Frege and Russell and ending with modern linguists (eg Kobozeva IM) [101, p. 352] - absolutely unconvincing. The selection of meaning or the very concept of meaning emphasizes, firstly, the failure of the idea of convention and, secondly, shows the greater complexity of the idea of linguistic meaning than is commonly

thought. If the words 'world', 'house', 'temple' acquire a special meaning within the religious worldview (language game), it means that they change their linguistic meaning in this context. Perhaps we are talking about the so-called connotative meaning or about the pragmatic potentialities of the sign [102, p. 41]. The classic example of Walter Scott, who claimed that he was not the author of "Waverley", but not that he was not Walter Scott, that is, himself, also does not achieve the goal, because if Walter Scott stated that he did not write a novel , which he actually wrote, he thus abandoned some meaning of the concept of "Walter Scott", that is, just stated that he is not him. If Walter Scott renounced everything he did in life, any situations in which he was present, it would mean in full that he refuses to recognize himself as Walter Scott. The Apostle Peter, for example, renounces only one event in his life and has to renounce himself.

In other words, the principle of the substitutability of the identical is not the rule for all possible languages and, above all, is unsuitable for natural language.

In "Philosophical Studies" L. Wittgenstein discusses the relationship between name and meaning, name and its interpretation: "Let's talk first of all about the fact that the word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it. -It is important to establish that the word 'meaning' is used contrary to the spirit of the language [contrary to the rules of the language] if it denotes a thing that 'corresponds' to that word. This is called confusing the meaning of a name with a name carrier. If Mr. MM died, they say, the bearer of the name died, not the meaning of the name died. And it would be pointless to say that, because if the name ceased to matter, it would make no sense to say 'Mr. MM. died '" [103, p. 261]. «For a large class of uses of the word 'meaning' - even if not in all cases of its use - this word can be interpreted as follows: the meaning of the word is its use in language. And sometimes they explain the meaning of the name, pointing to its bearer [Träger] "[100, p. 262-263].

Wittgenstein argues that naming and description [Benennen und Beschreiben] are not on the same level: naming is a preparation for description. The name is not yet a move in a language game, just as the arrangement of chess pieces is not yet a move in a chess game. You could say that nothing has been done with the name of the thing yet. It also has no name other than in the game. This is what Frege meant: the word has meaning only in the context of the sentence "[100, p. 267].

"I want to call [a word] a 'name' only what cannot be included in the phrase´X.' - And so you can't say 'Red exists', because if there was no red, you could talk about it at all. Really: if 'X´exists' means only that 'X' matters, then it is not a sentence that refers to X, but a sentence about our use of the word, namely, the use of the word 'X'. Names denote only what is an element of reality. That which cannot be destroyed; something that does not change with all the changes. –But what is it? - While we were making the offer, it was already in front of us! We have already expressed a definite idea. A specific [Bild] image that we want to use. But experience does not show us these elements. We see the components of something complex (a chair, for example). We say the back is part of a chair, but it is made up of different pieces of wood; while the leg is a simple component. We also see a whole that changes (collapses), while its constituent parts remain unchanged. These are the materials from which we build such an image [Bild] of reality "[100, p. 273-274].

We can say that naming – Benennen is not a multifaceted attitude or a special element of all our language games and can therefore be considered differently, depending on the objectives and goals of a particular study. In addition to logic and linguistics, naming, including the problem of psychology, because it is a mental act, to argue with it would be, to say the least, strange. Moreover, for the sake of completeness, naming should be considered in a certain cultural and historical context, which has long been done. If we are going to consider the naming procedure in its stricter, universal form, then this is no reason to reject

everything else. We just have to follow the language game we have chosen for this.

The problem with any "... philosophical theory of language" is not how strange the connection between a word and a subject is. We can see this wonder to the point of complete mystification or deny it, as Wittgenstein does, but this is not a logical extension of the main problem: what is the connection of a sign with a signifier, a name with a caller, a word with an object; what is the mechanism of communication and what makes it possible. Occam understood this well. If the signs were simple labels, pointers to physical, directly given things, we would not consider the situation problematic. Although even then there would be questions about the quality and designation of qualities (green, round, ripe); as well as signs of action or passivity (running, sleeping, sitting idly by), suffering (being deceived, becoming disabled); about the signs of past and future events; about the signs of imperceptible objects, etc. In any case, it would complicate the life of any analyst "[99, p. 243].

But deep in our questions about name and naming lies an even more important problem: the reality of what signs signify, especially when signs signify other signs or products of our mental life, whatever we mean by that. Intuitively, we understand that the notation is a virtual process (ideal) and at least for that reason - quite arbitrary, all conceivable obligation of which is enclosed in the so-called convention, which, however, also no one concluded and which is only a more or less convenient metaphor that expresses the very fact of linguistic unity. The fact is that we use a common system of notation for a class of events, using which, we understand each other. The same fact is the connection of our words (signs) with a different (usually) reality, which they are, as they say, denote.

In the process of associating a mark with what is being denoted, at least one other agent or intermediary emerges, which is the result and possibly the sole purpose of the marking process. Our language has long recorded the presence of this agent

and calls it meaning or content, depending on the circumstances. The trend in linguistics, which F. de Saussure considers to be its ancestor, opposes the isolation of this agent as a special reality. Since the values are somehow determined by a linguistic sign, and the latter is defined as a sign only on the grounds that it means something, to avoid circulusvitiosusproposed to consider the form of the sign (acoustic image) and its meaning (concept) inseparableintegrity as two sides of the same sheet of paper. The sign initially consists of the form of the sign fixed in some image and the maintenance which is meant, is thought in a sign.

In order not to make the presence of a sign a value dependent on incidental, extralingual and, most often, random factors, I am ready to enter the value (meaning) as a special relationship or agent that is neither contained in the sign nor in what is denoted in reality, neither in the interpreter itself, but is a constant procedure of notation, which, for instrumental reasons (for example, to compile a dictionary), can be stopped at any time, and then we call the value the result of this process.

Wittgenstein's earlier view links the meaning of a proposition to its verification: "The meaning of a proposition is its verification. For example, if I say, 'There's a book in the drawer', how do I do that to verify it? Is it enough if I look at it, or if I continue to look at it from different angles, or if I take it in my hands, feel it, open it, turn it over, etc.? There are two points of view. One says: no matter how hard I try to do it, I can never fully verify the proposal. The offer always leaves itself open as a backdoor. No matter what we do, we are never sure that the offer is true.

Another point of view, which I would like to defend, emphasizes: no, if I can never fully verify the meaning of a sentence, then I also have nothing under the sentence in mind. Then the proposal means nothing at all "[104, p. 47].

Why do both positions look so tempting and internally justified? And why do I want to dwell on the first of them. What is this love of open systems? Is this choice

subject to any explanation? First, I am not able to not only fully verify a large number of proposals, but also to verify them in general, but I can undoubtedly mean something meaningful under this proposal. Secondly, I really can't be sure that I didn't make a mistake in my verification, because I was often deceived even in the simplest situations. Third, no sentence, like all our language, is unambiguously complete semantically, time and circumstances change its meaning or how it relates to the linguistic subject. The second opinion is very rigorous, it sends most of our proposals to the landfill, declaring them meaningless. It looks like a wish or a program of action to verify (or falsify) all possible proposals, but intuitively unreliable.

A special place in Wittgenstein's work on understanding the essence and role of signs is occupied by texts and recordings of conversations within the Viennese circle, which formed a separate volume in the collection of works of the philosopher.

A name always matters if it has a denotation, but a name can have a meaning without a denotation, and finally, a name cannot have a denotation without meaning. In this case, "... the presence of a meaning is a more essential characteristic of the name than its relation to some real object; the presence of the latter is a matter of chance, the presence of the former is essential for distinguishing a name as a name. Meaning is considered here as the same as meaning, and the latter as a more or less successful semantic variation on the theme of meaning. If it is not necessary to connect the meaning of a word with something real or what we consider to be so, then it is not so necessary to distinguish between meaning and sence "[99, p. 244]. This approach persists until the material under consideration forces us to distinguish meaning as a special semantic category.

3.2. Reception of hermeneutic ideas as a modern development of analytical philosophy

Simulation of meaning can be called a game with even greater grounds than all other linguistic acts. And as in most games, we are faced with some rules of the game, as well as with the interpretation of game acts and the rules themselves. For example, in chess it is possible to interpret the position, but it is impossible to interpret the rules, because any interpretation is a violation of them. Yes, I can play chess with someone on a conventional cylindrical or spherical board, but this is another game, only similar to ordinary chess and to the uninitiated it will seem at least unusual. In other games, such as football, the interpretation of the rules is allowed by both the players and the referee, but here one or another interpretation of the rule is not related to the essence of the game. Simply put, a "perfect" football is possible, say, in a computer version, in which the rules cannot be interpreted, because they cannot be violated.

However, there are many games in which the interpretation of the rules is their essential characteristic, and the rules themselves are extremely conditional, vague and numerous, moreover, in such games is often completely denied the existence of rules and the game continues to be carried out. We are talking about military and political games, love games (for example, in the field of discourse, as in R. Bart), the game behavior of people in different social groups: professional corporations, criminal communities, religious, age and other subcultures.

Here is a game of implicit and vaguely defined rules, and each group creates its own rules of the game and the rules of its interpretation, using, of course, common language and cultural standards, but the lack of clarity and rigidity of rules (like in chess) leads to numerous and sometimes spectacular conflicts.

Isn't the meaning itself something artificial, a kind of redundancy that falls under Occam's razor? Unlikely. In any case, Occam himself, in addition to signs, objects denoted by signs and the naming itself (appellatio), also introduces suppositions

(suppositio-substitution, implication), as a property inherent in the term in the statement.

Occam distinguishes suppositions in the proper sense (propria) and in the improper (impropria), when the word is used in an inappropriate sense. For example, ἀντ-ονομασία – replacement of a name with an epithet (gram. Pronoun). By the way, it is interesting that the pronoun is an epithet. "I" as an epithet of my name. Also: μετα-φοράι συν-εκδοχή – use of a word in another sense; ὀξύ-μωρον – figurative combination of contradictory concepts ("living corpse"); μετ-ωνυμία – rename an object.

In the proper sense of supposition there are: suppositio personalis ('Socrates runs'); suppositio simplex ('A cat is a species'); suppositio materialis ('Cat's noun'). Thus, Occam's supposition includes without removal the naming procedure and the natural meaning of the word, but opposes the concept, artificial, created meaning, such as universals.

Suppositions contain the name and meaning of the name and operate in the framework of any context, which may include (in mind) the description of things unreliable or non-existent, or those whose existence can not be asked correctly. Occam's suppositions, judging by the above examples, are a variation on the meaning of the expression, which is built on the natural meaning of the name and introduces it into a certain context (language game) [105, p. 29-35].

Wittgenstein says that a sign can matter even if its bearer (denotate, referent) has ceased to exist. That is, we can not always identify the bearer of the name by pointing a finger at him. In addition, often the carrier is in principle not localized in space-time to undergo such a procedure. For example, the word "history" has a meaning without a medium that can be poked with a finger. The distinction between the meaning of a name (method of use) and the bearer of a name (denotation) is quite fundamental, because if we recognize that there are

names that have meaning without having a real bearer, then we part with the classical definition of Frege: this subject marked by this name [106, p. 233].

It can be argued that, unlike fictional characters whose names have no meaning, the bearer of a name with meaning has existed in the past. In that case, we become embroiled in an endless search for who, where, and when existed, and whether it actually existed. Judgments about the historical Napoleon may be as far from the truth as Count Shakespeare's judgments about Richard III, the character of the tragedy.

If, together with Frege and Russell, we believe that the name "Hamlet" has no meaning or has it only in a conditional context (has meaning), then what happens if it suddenly becomes clear that Shakespeare's tragedy is almost literally reproduced medieval chronicle about real events and with real participants? Does the name "Hamlet" mean right away? But in fact, that is, logically, nothing has changed. Will they find out tomorrow that the medieval manuscript is a fake and the word will lose its meaning again? Or we learn that Odysseus existed and that he really landed somewhere there, that is, committed acts as a real person in the real story. Why not? It is not appropriate to assume that the meaning of a word does not depend on the nature, nature, properties of the reality it means. Wittgenstein, in essence, departs from the denotative definition of meaning, moving from logic to linguistic pragmatics and, accordingly, to pragmatic definition.

This is what makes his position similar to the point of view of philosophical hermeneutics, because hermeneutics deals with pragmatic aspects of linguistic meaning, no matter how formal it may seem. But the interpretation of Kafka's novels from this point of view, delving into the psychological world of the author or his characters, the search for social and historical analogies - all this is a pragmatic aspect of hermeneutic discourse and formalism or even technicality of the word should not mislead us.

Another way to get rid of the meaning-dualism was found by C.W. Morris, who points to the constant confusion with the term "meaning." Sometimes the value indicates the signifiers, in other cases - the denotation or the process of semiosis as such, and often the significance or value. Morris sees a way out of the situation in the rejection of the word "meaning" (or in clarifying its meaning in each case), because the latter can not be strictly unambiguously defined.

Instead, he offers his vision of the process of signification, characterizing it as a process in which something functions as a sign, and what can be called semiosis. This process in the Greek tradition has usually been seen as involving three (or four) factors: what acts as a sign; what the sign indicates (refersto); influence, due to which the corresponding thing is a sign for the interpreter. These three components of semiosis can be called, respectively, a sign tool (or sign carrier) (signvehicle), designator (designatum) and interpreter (interpretant), and as a fourth factor can be introduced interpreter [107, p. 39]. Another complication: When it comes to meaning, attempts to look for it resemble the search for marble balls for the game: meaning is seen as some thing among other things, as a certain "something" that is in some way located somewhere [107, p. 75]. Such a place can be either a designer who turns into a Platonic idea, or an interpreter who transforms into conceptualism into a special idea that lives in a special sphere of mental units [107, p. 75].

There is a rather strange distinction between synonyms (denotation and designator). "Centaur" has a designator, ie a class of centaurs with the number of members = 0; or - has no denotation. But if we take the class of mythological creatures as the designation of the word "Centaur", then "Centaur" acquires a denotation, because it will become an equal member of the class.

Generally speaking, the "designat-denotat" scheme is functionally very similar to the construction: "sence-meaning".

It seems that all the confusion arises from the persistent desire of a number of Anglo-American authors to maintain the setting of "common sense" and anywhere to extend the distinction between "real" and "fictional" objects, and even in cases where the material is completely indifferent to this desire.

Morris's theory of the four components of semiosis is equally artificial. Rather, these components themselves take place, but their selection seems quite arbitrary (intuitive). It is clear that there is an interpreter, an interpretation, what is interpreted and what is interpreted.

The number of levels and the degree of detail can vary significantly. It is possible to enter into the structure of semiosis: preconditions and result of definition, it is possible to distinguish individual semiosis and socio-semiosis, waking and in a dream, to enter time as measurement of semiosis and so to infinity. But despite the possibility of such a complication, the four-part scheme (with some caveats) is best suited for our tasks. All possible extensions of this scheme can be entered ad hoc.

Morris himself in a later work [108] somewhat modified the structure of the process of semiosis. Thus, "semiosis (or sign process) is considered as a five-membered relation –V, W, X, Y, Z, –in which V causes in W a tendency to a certain reaction (X) to a certain kind of object (Y), which, therefore, does not act as an incentive) under certain conditions (Z). In cases where this relation exists, V is a sign, W is an interpreter, X is an interpreter, Y is a meaning [designation, signification), and Z is a context in which a sign occurs "[108, p. 119].

What if the context (Z) is a situation of some fantastic dream, an object to be defined - some terrible, hitherto unseen creature. In this case, the interpreter responds to this situation by waking up in horror and trying to find a sign to indicate a monster seen in a dream. Morris scheme is more suitable for describing the situation of a psychosemantic experiment, where we study the readiness of the subject to certain reactions (semantic assessments) when encountering certain

objects. This is shown by the author's remarks on the description of this process: connotations "[108, p. 120].

If in 1938 Morris believed that the interpreter is the meaning, then later the meaning became an object in the structure of semiosis, and the interpreter - a specific (primarily behavioral) reaction to the meaning. First, it is similar to the approach in which the value of a name is considered to be its denotation, that is, an object that is denoted by that name. Secondly, giving the meaning of somewhat greater autonomy from the sign on the one hand and from the interpreter, on the other, does not help to answer the main question: what is the meaning of signs denoting "inconvenient" (non-existent) for semiotics objects.

This approach introduces the very meaning as something different from the three traditional components of the process of semiosis: the sign carrier, the designer and the interpreter [101, p.31.]

Accordingly, we can focus on several possible approaches. For example, J. Lyons identifies six theories of meaning: (1) reference, or denotative theory - the meaning of an expression is what it means;

(2) ideational, or mentalist theory - the meaning of an expression is an idea or concept that is associated with it in the mind of anyone who knows and understands the expression;

3) behavioral theory - the meaning of an expression is either the stimulus that causes it, or the reaction that it causes, or a combination of them in specific cases of expression;

(4) the theory of meaning as use - the meaning of an expression is determined (or coincides) with its use in language;

(5) verification theory - the meaning of an expression, if any, is determined by the possibility of verifying the propositions or propositions in which it is included;

(6) conditional-true theory - the meaning of the expression is its contribution to the conditions of truth of the sentences in which it is included [109, p. 57.]

Each of the theories focuses on some aspect of meaning and each in this regard can be considered "true". Is a universal theory of meaning possible, a theory suitable for all cases of definition? In any case, theories 1, 5, 6 cannot claim to be general, because they are otherwise related to the referential or corresponding theory of truth. As already mentioned, there are many cases of the use of linguistic expressions in which their true meaning is not fixed. In addition, the very concept of truth must be reconsidered for most natural language propositions. Theories 2, 3, 4 may well claim to be universal, although the latter two can be combined into one without fundamental difficulty, because, ultimately, linguistic behavior is the use of words and sentences.

It is difficult not to notice that the reference theory of meaning (ie the earliest and most common) is directly related to the correspondent theory of truth, with the subject-object opposition in our cognition and attitude to the world, and finally with the subject-predicative form sentences of logic and the connection of the subject-predicate of natural language. It is also undeniable that in order to fix the situation, the definition and presence of what we call "meaning" requires a subject in its psychological quality and, accordingly, a mental carrier of meaning that we use and corresponds to the stimul.

Thus we have before us the same specter of dualism: on the one hand, there is a linguistic behavior, a "body" of meaning, in all its various aspects, on the other, a mental act, a noesis, without which the process of signification turns into the registration of external objects, projects, or in the implementation of behavioral programs. In this opposition, "external-internal" I want to prefer the latter, because I can easily imagine the definition without externally observed behavior (internal language), but to imagine the use of language without a proper mental process is impossible. It can be argued, however, that any internal definition for each

linguistic subject is possible only on the basis of its former real linguistic practice and at any given moment provides for the possibility of external expression. It is also true that a certain technical device can pronounce words that matter (for example, to warn of danger), without any mental correspondence.

"The meaning of the expression is characterized for us by its use. Meaning is not a mental accompaniment of expression "[110, p. 104].

"The meaning of an expression depends solely on how we use it in the next move. We do not want to imagine meaning as a mysterious connection that the spirit makes between a word and a thing, we want to imagine that such a connection contains the full use of the word, just as, so to speak, a seed contains a tree. The essence of our thesis is that what feels pain or looks, or thinks, has a mental nature, is only that the word 'I' in the sentence "It hurts me" does not mean a certain body, because we can not replace ' I'm a description of the body "[110, p. 116].

Characteristically, all antimentalist attacks are not able to refute the basis of the theory itself - the presence of mental states (with all the consequences that follow from this - evidence, etc.), which is intuitively obvious to anyone, does not create a fairly decent explanatory model that eliminates mental acts. One-time theoretical benefits do not justify long-term consequences for further consideration of the material of psychology, linguistics, semantics, etc.

The inclusion of the interpreter in the concept of the sign in Ch.U. Morris [or, for example, Lebedev MV Stability of language meaning. - therefore means nothing more than the introduction of a mental component in the definition of a sign. After all, the interpreter not only acts, demonstrating an understanding of the sign, but also actually understands the sign without any action. One way or another, the interpreter introduces his own mental effort into the scheme of the sign.

It is worth noting that this is a general trend for many analysts - to move over time from more or less radical reductionism and behaviorism to the recognition or inclusion of mental acts and states in the process of semiosis. For example, H.

Putnam, introducing his "stereotypes", which are, in his words, "representation" of members of the linguistic community about the most typical features of the described object. At the same time, I should not behave behaviorally this idea, it is enough that I have it internally (mentally) [111, p. 207].

The same component essentially includes a "description of the normal form" for the meaning of the word: "My proposed solution is that the description of the normal form for the meaning of the word is a sequence or 'vector' that must contain such components (perhaps appropriate and other types of components): (1) syntactic markers applied to the word, for example, 'noun'; (2) semantic markers applied to the word, such as "animal", "period of time"; (3) description of additional features of the stereotype, if any; (4) the description of the extensional "[111, p. 230-231].

The latter, that is, the knowledge of the extensional, is considered by Putnam to be absolutely optional knowledge in determining the meaning of a word for any native speaker. In other words, I should know more about water, that it is a liquid, quenches thirst, etc., than that "water" = H2O. Indeed, we will not claim that Plato did not know what water is, on the grounds that he did not know modern chemistry. Obviously, I still do not know everything about water, but something tells me that I, like any other man, still know something important about it [111, p. 231].

Frege in a letter to Husserl divides the verbal universe into sentences, proper names and names of concepts (Begriffswort). I wonder if "the geographical center of Europe" or "original sin" is a proper name or a concept name? And so in the case of any metaphor or idiom. How to deal with the names of qualities, properties, relationships, and finally, actions and types of subjects. Logic is not obliged to copy grammar with its parts of speech, just as the grammatical gender, for example, does not always correspond to the biological sex, but may be

associated with the division into spiritualization inanimate, active and passive objects or their difference in size.

Frege points out that the correct connection between a sign, its meaning and sence must be such that the sign corresponds to a certain meaning, and the content, in turn, -a certain value, while one value (one subject) corresponds to more than one sign. The same meaning is expressed differently not only in different languages, but also in the same language. However, there are exceptions to this correct connection. Of course, in a perfect set of signs, each expression must meet only one specific meaning, but natural languages do not always satisfy this requirement and have to be satisfied so that at least for one reasoning the word always had the same meaning [112, p. 26-27].

In general, Frege's position can be drawn as follows: the name acts as a sign, which in one way or another is attached to all three components of the reference process: value-meaning-representation. The relationship between the members of this triad in Frege and beyond is not well understood, especially in terms of meaning.

The meaning of a proper name is the object itself, which we denote by that name; the idea we have is completely subjective; between them lies the meaning, which, although not as subjective as the idea, but still is not the subject itself [112, p. 29]. In our interpretation, this is explained as follows: a name (for example, "punishment") in a certain context (language game), relevant to the participant of the game (for example, a convict) causes a certain subjective image and has a whole conglomeration of meanings, from common vocabulary , to countless connotations, the meaning of which depends on the nature of the representation evoked by this name. Another name, for example, "sentence" has a different meaning, but similar connotations and subjective perceptions are different for the interested participant.

Representations (feelings, thoughts, attitudes) are also a subject that generates new semantic dependencies. The comparison in the right to reference real and virtual objects leads to the fact that all semantic problems acquire a real sharpness and taste of adventure, an intellectual adventure that has always been inherent in philosophy. Therefore, just as we refer to signs as a whole set of signs, everything that can be called, denoted, replaced by signs must be called a referent.

In turn, from the point of view of L. Wittgenstein, the connection of the name of the object, we can say, consists of illegible signs [scribbles] that are written on the object. But we are not satisfied with this, because we feel that the signs written on the subject, in themselves are not important to us and in no way interest us. And this is true; the whole meaning lies in a certain use which we find for the signs written on the subject, and we in a sense simplify the matter when we say that the name has a strange connection with its subject, different from that which exists between the subject and the sign. Primitive philosophy reduces the full use of the name to the idea of connection, which becomes a mysterious connection. <...> Now we could use the expression: "The relation of the name to the object is not only so trivial, 'purely external', so-called 'language' and what we call the connection between a name and an object is characterized by the full use of the name; but then it is clear that there is no relation at all between a name and an object, but there is a set of relations, that there is a set of uses of sounds or signs, which we call names. Therefore, we can say: if naming should be something more than just someone's use of sound to indicate something, then there must be some form of knowledge of how the sound or inscription should be used in a particular case "[113, p. 265-266].

Of course, it cannot be said that Frege, Wittgenstein, and even more so the representatives of the Viennese circle created something similar to philosophical hermeneutics, but it is correct to say that some general ideas about language, its nature, problems of meaning and interpretation can be traced here.

A special place is occupied by the question of the relation of hermeneutic discourse to the cognitive abilities of man, with all the epistemological problems. Human knowledge tends to integrity and completeness and, above all, due to the peculiarities of the formation of the mental image, more broadly, the mental picture of the world. Beyond our consideration remains the favorite question of the representatives of analytical philosophy: how would our holistic image of the world change if we had certain abilities that we do not usually possess: to perceive radioactive radiation, for example. Moreover, we are not just deprived of the ability to perceive much of the world and its properties, but even what we manage to perceive is often distorted or simply wrong. After all, we perceive reality through our existing channels, which often distort the information received. As a result, we can conclude that everything we know is in some sense wrong, that is, the reality of our immediate world is much more diverse than we can feel.

It is difficult not to acknowledge the validity of such statements, other than to explain the fact that we use many devices to register and measure the properties of reality. But if we are so limited in our cognitive abilities, then in what sense do we know about reality all we need to know? Isn't this the mental illusion of completeness and integrity that hides our shortcomings? Maybe it's just an adaptive mechanism that allows us not only to perceive but also to accept a segment of reality available to man. People extrapolate their imperfect ideas about this segment to the whole universe and call it a holistic image of the world. But perhaps there is no contradiction or complication, because we are talking primarily about the functional or operational unity of our ideas about the world, and most skeptics will probably agree.

Integrity and completeness in this case do not say anything about the amount of information that a person has. It is a way of his organization. Lack of information in any one segment of hermeneutic interpretation is immediately replaced by data from another department, even if they do not meet the criteria of common sense, let alone science. Suffice it to mention what strange inventions people create when

trying to explain things that are incomprehensible to them. Even modern people are very prone to this, filling in the gaps in their knowledge with everything that comes to hand.

We can agree that we see a hand and connect this or that image of reality, but this image is not a guarantee of its existence, it does not guarantee that the state of affairs is really like that. Here is what L. Wittgenstein writes: "2. If it seems so to me - or to everyone - it does not follow that this is so. But ask yourself whether it is possible to doubt this rationally. «3. For example, if someone said, "I don't know if it's a hand or not," they could say, "Look better." –This possibility of self-witness [Sichüberzeugens] belongs to the language game. This is one of its essential features "[114, p. 119]. «4. 'I know I'm a human'. In order to understand how vague the meaning of this proposition is, let us consider its negation. At the very least, it could be interpreted as saying, 'I know I have human organs.' (For example, the brain, although no one has seen it yet). And what about a sentence like 'I know I have a brain'? Can I doubt it? There is no reason to doubt! Everyone says that it exists. But it may turn out that after the operation my skull will be empty. "[114, p. 119-120].

If language conventions exist at all, then doubts about their correctness or necessity are possible and justified, moreover, such doubts must be. If the possibility of self-belief in the correctness of a statement is fundamental for our language games, then no less important is the possibility of denying the obvious. Contrary to common sense, people do this often, although from early childhood they freely or involuntarily join the language community, as if committing to use the language in a certain way [99].

Is it possible to really doubt the obvious and what contributes to such doubt? We can doubt anything, at least for aesthetic reasons or in a polemical situation, or use such doubts as a methodological procedure, following a number of philosophical schools, but in both cases the doubts will not be convincing, will

not go beyond the language game. called "a game of doubt." In contrast, you can still have some mood of doubt, a kind of mental disorder, when you see something or everything is not as before or not as others see. Language and mood, in fact, are the basis of doubt that obviously and under normal circumstances is not subject to verification [99].

In our moods, as well as in abnormal perception, in language and language games, we have the opportunity to doubt anything to imagine, for example, that the skull at autopsy will not be empty, but contains a mechanism or an electronic device.

Our ability to produce illusions, and some of them to be considered truly existing, is an epistemological fact. If we give this circumstance ontological significance, we can decide that the things that surround us are not reliable enough, at any moment anything can happen to them and this is "anything" we can imagine.

It is easy to see that Wittgenstein is trying to talk about testing things empirically. And what about abstractions, substance, essence, etc.? Can I imagine such a check, as a result of which any of the above would be non-existent, because I can not imagine the reverse procedure. I can doubt the fact that I have a brain, I can imagine that at autopsy, that is, in reality, my skull will be empty. Although it is fantastic, but you can imagine. But how to actually doubt the existence of one's own self. It seems that this is beyond imagination. It is difficult to check the presence of an entity here and now if the presence itself can appear only together with the subject and only as a background for its existence.

One way or another, if not ontological, then epistemological value of our fantasies certainly have, and therefore in the future I will consider the products of our mental and linguistic activity as aesthetic and semantic phenomena, without insisting on their "full" ontological status.

For each proposal that I can say or think, there is a measure of linguistic and personal belief in its truth. «5. Will the proposal turn out to be wrong [erroneous]

in the future, due to the purpose for which I dedicated these proposals "[100, p. 120].

This criterion is a purely individual indicator, and if it is large enough, then I use statements such as "I know", "I am sure", "I am convinced" and vice versa. It is impossible to be sure of something irrespective of any criterion, that is, in absolute sense, as well as to despair of something in absolute sense. This would mean going beyond knowledge, mood, language, which is obviously impossible, although this very impossibility should be understood conditionally, because it is also difficult to imagine in the absolute sense.

Any proposal can be insured against falsification by consistently taking it beyond the contexts in which it may be erroneous. It is also possible that any proposal can be made true by finding the conditions under which it becomes so.

What does Wittgenstein's criterion mean - the purpose and purpose of the proposal? What truthfulness criteria do we recognize for a given proposal or proposals? Will it be in accordance with the "real state of affairs" or in accordance with my opinion, mood, my faith or compliance of the proposal with some language standard. Questions, commands, requests, hypothetical constructions, various expressive language acts, etc. - All such sentences can be correctly constructed from the point of view of grammar, but we must define them without assessing its reliability.

Everything related to human fantasies somehow reduces the rigidity of our true requirements and assessments. What truthfulness or authenticity is needed when telling about one's own fantasies? Also, what truth is required from the statement uttered in the dream itself? After all, it is in a dream you can meet a centaur or an Odyssey. How can one deny the truth of the statement about mermaids seen in a dream, if they were really present there. What should be considered decisive for such proposals? After all, this is the area of their real purpose and application.

It is characteristic that in my dream I can meet or think that I have met Sherlock Holmes or a centaur, but can I in my dream somehow substantiate the thesis that 2 x 2 = 5? Is this really a question of my imagination? But I can believe in my dream that 2 x 2 = 5. Will I have more reasons for this in a dream than in reality? There are probably no grounds, but there may be conviction. In this case, I can not just say that in a dream I'm wrong and I can be sure of something for no reason. And in reality, do I always look for reasons for my confidence? Most of the time, I just rely on my intuition, habit, or I think it doesn't matter how well-founded my confidence is.

In our study, the question of subjective attitudes of the native speaker remains out of consideration, which can also be considered as a criterion for the reliability of interpretation and which in one way or another transform any other criteria. Obviously, most of the criteria of authenticity can be formulated only in general terms, because the language norms themselves are quite vague, variable, prone to change.

Therefore, in connection with the above, it is possible to formulate a thesis that is intuitively followed by all native speakers: the criteria of authenticity for most statements of our language can not be formulated clearly and consistently. Isn't that why it is confronted with modern analytical philosophers who are trying to cleanse our language of ambiguities and overly subjective forms.

For example, there may be various deviations from the norms and just mistakes in the construction of sentences, however, to some extent we still understand what they are talking about.

In addition to purely linguistic connections and relationships, there are certain logical, historical, cultural, and aesthetic norms and stable correspondences that also characterize a proposition in terms of its truthfulness. In these cases, we are usually talking about semantic interaction with extraterrestrial environments - the living world, some ontological context. This applies not only to real objects, but

also to various kinds of virtual entities that are firmly established in modern philosophy.

Finally, epistemological validity provides the ability to formulate true sentences about fantasies, provided that the latter are considered in the appropriate context.

Wittgenstein's position and his contribution to the theory of interpretation is to recognize the main components of both our belief in something and our skepticism about any reality. Two such components: language and experience show the possibility of a feeling as an existential component of the worldview and the ability to express their condition. The latter is traditionally crystallized in the phenomenon of language and language interaction.

The combination of these components in each case, in fact, any cognitive, communicative or existential situation allows us to talk about the formation of a holistic picture of the world, which is the basis for the formation of hermeneutic discourse, which could equally be called a mental ontology.

What is a hermeneutic ontology? Holistic worldview, general impression of life, some psychological and existential states, together with their language form. Personal picture of the world, own interpretation of events and the main one - your experience of the world. Is the verbal form important for a hermeneutic ontology? It may be required, but it may not be, although in any case, outside the language or outside of any language, full certification is not possible. Such an understanding of the hermeneutic component of our knowledge, if considered quite broadly, completely exhausts our ability to accept something as reliable evidence or, conversely, to doubt the reality of a fact or event.

Beyond this position is another channel of communication with the world - our ability to perceive, based on known perceptual mechanisms. Of course, the information we receive with the help of the latter is the basis for the formation of any image of reality, however, it itself does not contain an assessment of events as reliable or unreliable, as well as the possibility of doubting such an assessment.

The information of our analysts is an important epistemological material for all our estimates, but it is based on something else. Hermeneutic ontology consists of procedures for finding meaning and forms of its existence, the form of worldview and mood that underlies the relationship to the world order. Hermeneutic understanding can be found in every person, regardless of all other conditions.

Of course, there is a logical form in artistic discourse, as well as any concept in essence - nothing, without its verbal embodiment. This whole scheme does not really have such a rigid form. It is constantly transformed from one act of thought to another, areas blurred, changed and flow into each other. In most cases, you can detect the prevalence of one of them over another.

Assessing the contribution of analytical philosophy in the formation of hermeneutic discourse, it can be noted that it is often in the shadow of phenomenology, existential philosophy, structuralism and other theories. However, it is the philosophy of L. Wittgenstein of the late period that demonstrates a certain potential for constructing a theory of interpretation. Ideas about language games, family similarities and other concepts and techniques look very productive for building a hermeneutic field. Of course, philosophical hermeneutics was not created within the framework of analytical philosophy, but from the point of view we defend here, any philosophical theory of language acts as a provocation, thematization of one or another aspect of hermeneutic discourse.

CONCLUSIONS

For all its ambiguity, multidimensionality and vagueness of its theoretical foundations, philosophical hermeneutics undoubtedly seeks to be constituted as a discursive norm that absorbs and subordinates all other linguistic practices. This allows us to speak of the hermeneutic paradigm of modern philosophy, the ideal of discourse, which has developed since antiquity and finds its embodiment and space in a wide range of modern philosophical theories. In a sense, we can talk about hermeneutics as a specific agent that penetrates into the depths of interpretive schemes and methodologies. Perhaps such a state of hermeneutics could provoke criticism and suspicion of inexhaustible totality and a kind of repression, if the very nature of hermeneutic discourse did not contradict such an understanding. Hermeneutics, by definition, opposes any violence against what is interpreted, seeking to reflect the full range of possible meanings and definitions.

The key problems of analytical philosophy are the definition of meaning (meaning) and significance as such, as well as in numerous situations of pragmatic use of language. The only difference between them and philosophical hermeneutics is that the latter pays more attention to interpretations of spiritual culture, focused on understanding the products of artistic creativity, while analytical philosophy at an early stage studied the language of scientific discourse, and later - the language of everyday life. But the discourse of everyday life, as we have tried to show, is the basis of any discourse in general and also requires hermeneutic analysis.

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